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ABSTRACT
Hypotheses
The basic hypothesis of this study is that form of government, type of
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout
rates. The forms of government used as the basis for analysis in this study are
the mayor-council and the council-manager. The commission form of local
government has been omitted because there were too few commission cities in
the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The types of electoral system are
partisan and nonpartisan. The legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is
utilized, i.e,
,
whether or not the party affiliation of the candidate appears on the
ballot, not whether there exists any actual party activity. The socio-economic
characteristics are divided into three categories: (1) population growth and
mobility, (2) population homogeneity, and (3) social class. Population growth
and mobility refer to percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants
from different county, respectively. Population homogeneity refers to the
2percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born persons and
percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage). Social class refers to
occupation, education, homeownership, and income. ^
Subsidiary Hypotheses
A related subsidiary hypothesis of this study is that form of government
is related to socio-economic characteristics. 2 Because earlier studies have
found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-
economic environment, it is necessary to re-examine their findings as form of
government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being
related to voter turnout. Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relation-
ship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic
characteristics should be provided.
Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses to be investigated:
For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public
Administration Review
,
21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role
of Social Class in American Voting Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly
,
26 (March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of
Local Political Involvement, " American Sociological Review (December, 1968).
2
“"John Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment: A
Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review , 56
(September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Govern-
ment and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political
and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities," Municipal Year Book , (Chicago:
International City Manager's Association, 1965).
31. Manager governments are likely to manifest a more
rapid population growth and population mobility than
mayor-council governments.
2. Manager governments more than mayor-council
governments are likely to have a higher percentage of
college-educated persons, a higher percentage of
white-collar workers, a lower percentage of persons
earning $3,000 or less, a higher percentage of persons
earning $10,000 or more, and a higher percentage of
homeowners.
3. Mayor-council governments are likely to be located
in communities with higher non-white and a higher
ethnic population than manager governments.
Basic Hypothesis
Subsequent to the analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the basic
hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government,
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated. The
specific propositions are:
1. The mayor-council form of government is more likely
to encourage and witness greater voter participation
and turnout than manager governments. ^
2. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan
elections exist than where nonpartisan elections take
place. Thus, nonpartisanship has the tendency to
reduce voter turnout. 4
^Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of
California Press, I960); and Lee and Alford, j)]D. cit.
4 Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, 0£. cit.
43. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan
elections are combined with the mayor-council form
of government than where other combinations of
electoral systems and forms of government exist. ^
4. Cities with rapid population growth and high mobility
will experience low voter turnout.
5. Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the
percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the
population increases.
6. Voter turnout is likely to be higher in those cities with
a higher percentage of white-collar employees, home-
owners, and a higher percentage of high income persons
than in cities with high percentages of opposite character-
istics.
7. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high
percentage of non-white population.
8. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with high
ethnic population (i.e.
,
foreign born and population
of native-mixed parentage).
Methodology
This study is an offshoot of a larger, more comprehensive study.
Although the present study is a study of voter turnout in American cities, all
cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis. A random sample of
cities in four states was drawn. These four states are California, Illinois, New
York and Texas. These particular states were chosen because: (1) each has
a large number of cities with over 100,000 population; and because (2) they
°Lee and Alford, Ibid.
6Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, ,rVoting Turnout in American Cities,
American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.
5represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West, North Central,
Northeast and South, respectively. This does not mean, necessarily, that each
state is ’’representative" of other states in that region.
The cities range in population size from 5,000 to 250,000. To facilitate
the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of 5, 000-
10,000, 10,001-50,000, and 50, 001-250, 000. In each of these categories a
maximum sample of 75 cities was drawn. In cases where the maximum sample
could not be drawn, all cities for that population size were utilized. The total
number of cities came to 558, from which data for cities were able to be
included in the actual study.
This study was undertaken to explore further the phenomenon of voter
turnout in municipal elections. The attempt has been to analyze certain forms
of government and socio-economic characteristics which may act as stimulants
or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout. Most of the previous
studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore
many of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout were derived
from such studies. However, a few studies have investigated coter turnout
locally with similar assumptions as a basis. This study not only investigated
and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced
region as an intervening variable. In most cases, the findings confirm those of
earlier works, but in some cases they differ.
6Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant
in positvely affecting the level of voter turnout in municipal elections. In
every instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of
turnout in all cities. But within the limited parameters of accountable variation,
some pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and
turnout developed. Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis
of socio-economic characteristics:
1. A rapidly growing population led to a reduce voter turnout.
2. Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily
experience low voter turnout.
3. Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons
did not necessarily have a larger turnout than cities
with a high percentage of less-well -educated persons.
In general, education (well educated and less well
educated) decreased coter turnout. In mayor-council
cities, however, a large less-wll-educated population
reduced turnout.
4. Basically, a high percentage of white collar workers and
homeowners, factors normally associated with high
voter turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout.
Income (high and low) resulted in increased turnout.
5. Cities with a large non-white population did not
necessarily have low voter turnout. But in manager
cities, non-white population was negatively related
to turnout, while in mayor-council cities a large
non-white population increased turnout, especially
in mayor-council partisan cities in the Northeast
and North Central.
76. Ethnicity (i.e.
,
foreign-born and native
-mixed parentage
persons) in large proportions in the population led to
increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial
foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population
resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in
mayor-council cities.
The conclusions derived from this analysis were:
1. Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger
turnout than cities with manager governments, except
in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly
higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2. Basically, manager governments had the effect of
discouraging a large turnout.
3. Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter
turnout than cities with partisan elections.
4. Cities with mayor-council-partisan governments had
a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But
when this relationship was viewed within regions, only
in the North Central was it likely that mayor-council-
partisan cities had a higher turnout than cities with
other combinations of governmental forms and electoral
systems.
5. Region as an intervening variable had greater significance
as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures
as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic
characteristics as determinants of turnout.
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CHAPTER I
URBAN POLITICS AND THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Introduction
Robert Daland has contended "that political scientists have been slow to
study seriously the impact or urbanization on our governmental institutions and
political life" and that "the field of urban politics has been investigated only in
the most fragmentary way. 1,1 Furthermore, studies done were often descriptive
o
and prescriptive with hardly any explanatory details.
One of the first critics of the state of affairs in urban politics was
Herson, who in referring to municipal government as a "lost world" wrote in
1957, "in conceptual construction and in execution, most of the research in
this field falls short of the minimal requirements for a systematic political
^Robert Daland, "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism, "
American Political Science Review
,
51 (June, 1957), 507.
2
For a bibliography on studies of this nature, see Allen Richards,
"Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation, " Public Administration
Review
,
14 (Autumn, 1954), 271-277; L. J. Herson, "The Lost World of
Municipal Government, " American Political Science Review, 51 (June, 1957),
330-345; Daland, Ibid .
2science: for the literature of municipal government is studied with an array of
facts that have been gathered with little regard for the construction of general
theories; and at the same time, it is beset with theories that have been advanced
without ever being checked against available empirical data. "3
The significance of theory construction to systematic research in
political science in general and urban politics in particular is well recognized
for theory helps to determine the kinds of empirical phenomena which is to be
investigated and it provides the guideline for the types of instruments or tools
which will be utilized in the investigation. As Easton stated "research untutored
by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupportable by data, futile. Thus,
the failure to unite theory with facts or vice versa have been one of the major
shortcomings of political scientists in their study of urban government.
Since Herson's critique in 1957, much has been written in the field of
urban government and that which has been written has been directed towards
redressing the deficiencies cited by Herson. A review of this literature,
however, reflects the uneven nature of the research. For example in 1967,
^Herson, ojd. cit., 330.
^David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behaviorism in Political
Science, " in James Charlesworth, The Limits of Behaviorism in Political
Science, The American Academy of Political and Social Science (October, 1962),
F!
3Norton Long stated, "while the discipline has made some progress in tolerance
since the earlier dogmas of reform, it has shown only fitful concern with making
explicit the hypothesis underlying its prescriptions and submitting them to
empirical test. " He continued, ,fHerson's strictures in his essay.
. . seem
5
still applicable. " However, writing one year later, Herbert Jacobs and
Michael Lipsky stated that "state and local politics as a field of political science
is no longer a 'lost world' or site of' dullsville'. Rather than being the laggard of
the discipline that some political scientists perceive it to be, the study of state
and local politics has reentered the mainstream of political research.
Could the study of local politics have progressed so astronomically
that in one year it has "reentered the mainstream of political research?" Was
Long being overly pessimistic about the state of affairs or were Jacobs and
Lipsky exaggerating their optimism for future research in urban politics? It
is more probable that the actual state of research in urban politics lies some-
where in between the above two views.
^Norton E. Long, "Political Science and the City," in Leo Schnore (ed.),
Social Science and the City (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968), 244.
6 Herbert Jacobs and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structures, and Power:
An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics, " in Marian
Irish (ed. ), Political Science: Advance of the Discipline (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, Inc. 1968), 220.
4Although Jacobs and Lipsky made an unqualified statement about the
progress of state and local research, they were compelled to admit that "there
remains an unfortunate aridity to the discussion of community politics."^
Indeed their article is evidence of this point in that it reviewed an abundance of
research studies on the state level, but little at the local level. Of course, this
was due partially to the authors' desire to present materials in specific areas of
state and local government. But regardless, it raises the possibility that
political scientists may not be researching certain areas of local government.
o
One of these areas is local municipal voter turnout.
Theories and hypotheses derived from national election studies and
narrow-based municipal election studies have not been subject, with one or two
exceptions, to the kind of broad-based comparative test that is required for a
better understanding of municipal voter turnout. Therefore, the purpose of this
chapter is to clearly delineate by review of the literature, the areas of urban
research which political scientists have concentrated upon and to suggest that the
present study is an attempt to shed some light on one neglected area - comparative
municipal voter turnout.^
7 Ibid.
,
235.
^ For a review of this literature see Chapter three.
^One study which does systematically examine local elections compara-
tively is Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities,
"
American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.
5The areas in which substantial urban research has been conducted are:
(1) the reform movement with its accompanying principles and institutions;
(2) community power studies; and (3) structure, process, environment and
policy outcomes. The study of "metropolitan government" is not dealt with in
this review. 10
Reformism
The area of municipal government reform
are long on description and prescription, but short
is replete with studies which
on empirical proof. ^ In an
The following is an indication of the range of materials on metropolitan
areas: John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965); Vincent Ostrom, et. al. "The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, " American Political Science Review
,
55 (December, 1961), 831-42; Daniel Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional
Political Leadership," The Miami Metropolitan Experiment (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday and Company, 1966); David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville
Consolidation (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services,
Michigan State University, 1963); Frank Smallwood, Metro Toronto: A Decade
Later (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963); and Michael Danielson,
Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965); Phillip Coulter, Politics of Metropolitan Areas (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.
,
1967).
^Some studies of this type are: L. S. Rowe, Problems of City
Government (New York: D. Appleton and Co.
,
1908); John A. Farlie, Municipal
Administration (New York: MacMillan Co., 1920); Frank Goodnow, City
Government in the United States (New York: The Century Co., 1904); William
B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration (New York: MacMillan
Co., 1930).
6era when municipal government was diagnosed as permeated with evil and
corruption, reformers who valued efficiency, economy, and democracy in
government, promulgated certain principles which they envisioned as the proper
treatment for the ills of municipal government. These principles, derived
largely from administrative theory, were elevated to the position of what
lo
Charles Hyneman calls a theology and metaphysics. But, the curious
inexplicable fact is that while administrative theory began to change in the 1940 's,
local government research in general and reformist philosophy in particular
remained attached to a theory which was being questioned in its own field. ^
12An abundance of literature which describes the activities of bosses
and machines exist. Bosses and machines were, supposedly corrupting influence.
Dayton D. McKean, The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1940); J. T. Salter, Boss Rule (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co.,
1935); Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1937); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1930); Edward M. Sait, ’’Machines, Political, "
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658: For a description of
corruption in several cities see Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New
York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904); Steffens provides a more perceptive
view of the prevalence of corruption - the indifference and dual standards of
the citizenry - in Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt and
Brace, 1931); Bosses and machines provided certain necessary needs of the
people. This view is treated superbly by Robert Merton, ’’The Latent Function of
the Machine, " in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, Inc. 1957).
Charles S. Hyneman "Administration Reorganization,” in A. N.
Christensen and E. M. Kirkpatrick, The People, and the Politician: Readings in
American Government (New York: H. H. Holt and Co. , 1941).
14
The change in administration theory was probably signaled by Herbert
Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1945).
7Some of the principles of reform which provided the foundation for much
political research in municipal government were: (1) that politics should be taken
out of local government: (2) that there should be a separation of politics or
legislation from the administration of local government; (3) that the "business"
of city government should be separated from state and national politics; and
(4) that local government should be made more democratic. The institutional
arrangements which were thought to be conducive to accomplishing these
principles were nonpartisanship elections, council-manager government and the
short ballot.
These principles and many others have come under acute scrutiny by
political scientists using empirical data. For instance, nonpartisanship,
15
presently used in 67% of the cities with populations greater than 5,000, was
thought by the reformers as the answer for extricating "politics" from city
government. But, nonpartisanship became a camouflage for actual partisan
activity. Also, groups not previously influential became politically influential
16
and other unanticipated effects resulted.
15
Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Manager's
Association, 1969).
16
J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations
and A Case Analysis, " American Journal of Sociology , 64 (1958), 282-289; G. W.
Pearson, "Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election, " Public Opinion Quarterly , 12
(Spring, 1948), 115; Charles Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections,"
Western Political Quarterly
,
12 (June, 1959), 449-458; Adrian, "Some General
Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections, " American Political Science Review ,
46 (September, 1952), 766-76; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The
Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot, " American Political^
8Under the council manager system, politics was supposed to be
separated from administration. The council was to be responsible for the
legislative aspect of government while the manager, a neutral, competent,
corporate model executive, was to be liable for administrative functions. Council
manager government, upon close scrutiny, has not lived up to what was expected
17
of it. Banfield and Wilson stated that "the expectation that the plan would
reduce cost of local government has been sadly disappointed. Generally taxes
have gone up, not down, after its adoption. " Administration has not been
Science Review
,
53 (December, 1959), 1052-63; Charles Gilbert, "Some Aspects
of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities," Midwest Journal of Politics
, 6 (1962),
345-62; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal
Elections, " Public Opinion Quarterly
,
30 (Spring, 1966), 79; Robert Salisbury and
Gordon Black, "Class and party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The
Case of DesMoines, " American Political Science Review
,
57 (December, 1963),
584-592; Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan Elections: A Political Illusion? (New York
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958); Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship
(Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1960); Charles Gilbert and
Christopher Clague, "Electoral Systems in Large Cities, " Journal of Politics
,
24 (1962), 323 and Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis, "
National Municipal Review (November, 1949), 485-490.
17
For a good study on function and office of manager government see
Leonard White, The City Manager (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927);
also an extensive study of manager government is provided by Harold A. Stone,
Kathryn A. Stone, and Don K. Price, City Manager Government in the United
States (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940).
l8
Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), 185.
9separated from legislation, for the manager, although publicly shunting a policy
19
role, has been a chief policy innovator.
The short ballot, which would allow voters to personally know their
candidates, was thought to be the mechanism for making local government more
democratic. Having only the council held politically responsible for its policies
by the people was also thought to aid the democratizing process. However, these
efforts to make local government more democratic seemed to have eluded the
reformers. Banfield and Wilson noted that "it is not clear that it (council-
manager government) has always accomplished what its innovators mainly
intended - namely by centralizing authority to make local government an effective
20instrument for carrying out the popular will. "
This brief review of research in reformism indicates that only in
recent years have the principles and/or theories of the reform movement been
Charles Adrian, "Leadership and Decision Making in Manager Cities, "
Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer, 1958), 208-13; Karl Bosworth, "The
Manager is a Politician, " Public Administration Review
,
14 (Autumn, 1954),
253-8; C. A. Harrell and D. G. Weidford, "The City Manager and the Policy
Process, " Public Administration Review
,
2 (1959), 101-107; and Gladys Kammerer,
et. al.
,
City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure Termination
,
(Gainesville: University of Florida Monograph Social Sciences, 13 (Winter, 1962).
20
Banfield and Wilson, oj). cit.
,
186. The democratic aspect of reform
government is discussed also in the following: Kent Mathewson, "Democracy in
Council-Manager Government, " Public Administration Review , 2 (1959), 183-185.
10
subjected to empirical investigations. These studies open up possibilities for
other such research which would examine the effects of reformism up many
other areas and aspects of local government. 21
Community Power Studies
The local community has always been a convenient and natural setting
for researchers. The many areas of community life could be studied and
restudied with minimal expenditure of money and little required time.
Community decisions on taxes and bonds, community organization, participation,
and leadership have long been of interest to many researchers, especially
sociologists. However, there was always the problem of generalizing the
findings from the study of a single community to other communities.
Replication is difficult because communities can be atypical, therefore, caution
must be employed in generalizing findings.
Political scientists were slow to take advantage of the community as a
natural setting for studies of political leadership and power structure. Answer-
ing the question of who rules or - to use Harold Lasswell's words "who gets
21
Indicative of this trend are the following: Robert Lineberry and
Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities,"
American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706 and Robert
Lineberry, "Political Structures and Public Policies in American Cities,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
1968).
11
what, when, and how" seemed to have been the special province of sociologists. 22
Much of the research in community leadership and power has been
characterized by basic methodological difficulties and implicit ideological
positions. When political scientists entered the area in mid-1950, there ensued
more than a decade of interdisciplinary controversy between the pluralist-
minded political scientists and the elite-minded sociologists, each utilizing
different methodologies. This struggle between the discipline obscured the
real substantive issues at hand - community leadership and power.
Sociologists have almost unanimously used the positional or reputational
approach to discovering community power. 23 The assumptions of these studies
were: (1) that an economic elite class rules in the local community; (2) that
oo
Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York:
Meridan Books, 1958).
oo
Some of these studies are: Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small
Town in Mass Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); Warner,
Yankee City (New Haven: Yale University, 1941); Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd,
Middletown (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1929); ibid., Middletown in Transition
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1937); August B. Hollingshead,
Elmtown's Youth (New York: John Wiley, 1949); Floyd Hunter, Community
Power Structures (Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina Press,
1953); W. Loyd Warner, Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper, 1949);
E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentleman (Glencoe, III. : Free Press, 1958);
Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York:
Harcourt and Brace, 1953); for application of the positional approach nationally
see, C. Wright Mills, Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956)
and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America , (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1967).
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the political and civic leaders occupy a position subordinate to this economic
elite class; (3) that this economic elite class dominate the many facets of
local community life; (4) that this economic elite class rules selfishly - only
in its own interest; and (5) that social conflict takes place only between the
economic elite class and the subordinate non-elite class.
The positional approach assumed that in order to discover the power
elite, one merely determined who occupied the top echelons in the economic,
political and social realm and also who were most important in influencing
24
policies in the private organizations. The methodological difficulty with
this approach is that those holding power are a priori defined as occupying top
positions with no attempt to empirically determine whether or not power can
be considered synonymous with position. Consequently, "potential" power
holders were located, rather than "actual" power holders.
An example of the reputational approach is the pioneer study of Atlanta
O c
by Floyd Hunter. Hunter developed a list of "knowledgeables" (a panel of
14 judges) and asked them for names of persons whose opinion would influence
them the most on various issues or topics. This technique resulted in a list
of one-hundred seventy-five influentials from which forty were arbitrarily
24
The seminal studies using this method are two studies of Muncie,
Indiana by Robert and Helen Lynd, ibid. , and the study of a New England
community by Lloyd Warner, Yankee City , ibid.
25 Hunter, o£. cit .
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selected as the top influentials. A variety of social background information
was collected on these influentials. Hunter assumed that these influentials had
shared interests which they desired to protect or promote. Consequently, they
were interviewed to determine their exercise of power and the degree to which
they interacted with each other. Hunter's methodology led to his finding a
dominant economic power elite who controlled "Regional City. " °
Hunter's study served as a catalyst for propelling political scientists
into the area of community power studies, most often as critics of Hunter's
methodology. One of the first, and more critical analyses, was that by Jones
27
and Kaufman which labeled Hunter's method as intuitive rather than scientific.
Thomas Anton, commenting on the Jones and Kaufman critique noted that:
The review of Hunter's book by Kaufman and Jones
was in some ways an important milestone for political
science. Although, the book was challenged on both
substantive and methodological grounds, the devotion
of so much space to a sociologists work in the Public
Administration Review constituted a recognition of
the relevance of this kind of inquiry for those who
labored in the vineyards of political science and public
administration. Indeed, lurking between every line of
the review was an implicit exhortation to political
26 For a view favorable towards Hunter, and a review of the contribution
of these power studies to political science by sociologists, see Lawrence Herson,
"In the Footsteps of Community Power, " American Political Science Review , 55
(December, 1961), 817-30.
27
Victor Jones and Herbert Kaufman, "The Mystery of Power, " Public
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), 205-212.
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scientists to start working on this problem, if only
to substantiate the belief that Hunter was wrong
about Regional City. 2 ®
It did not take political scientists long to ’’start working on this problem, "
for within a few years a spate of articles appeared challenging Hunter's
methodology and findings. 29 Some of the criticism directed at Hunter's
methodology were: that his approach produced only "reputation" for power not
actual power exercise; that the approach generalized the scope of influence,
28Thomas Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics, " Administrative
Science Quarterly
, 7 (March 1963), 425-427.
29Delbert C. Miller, "Decision Making Cliques in Community Power
Studies," American Journal of Sociology
,
64 (November, 1958), 299-310;
Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City, " in Morris
Janowitz (ed. ), Community Political Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961);
Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political
Science Review
,
52 (June, 1958), 463-469; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology
of Community Power: A Reassessment, " Social Forces
,
37 (March, 1959),
232-236; ibid.
,
"Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power, "
American Journal of Sociology
,
25 (October, 1960), 636-644; Peter H. Rossi,
"Community Decision Making," Administrative Science Quarterly
,
1 (March,
1957), 415-443; Harry M. Scoble, "Yankeetown: Leadership in Three-
Decision-Making Processes, " in Janowitz, ibid
, ;
Robert E. Agger, "Power
Attributions in the Local Community: Theoretical and Research Considerations,"
Social Forces
,
34 (May, 1956); 332-337; and William H. Form and William V.
D’ Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage Among Community Influential in Two
Border Cities, " American Sociological Review
,
24 (December, 1959), 804-814;
Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games, " American
Journal of Sociology
,
64 (November, 1958), 251-61; Peter Rossi, "Power and
Community Structure, " Midwest Journal of Politics , 4 (November, 1960),
394-401.
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i.e„
,
Hunter assumed that influence in one area meant influence in another
area; that it is doubtful whether the panel of judges and the interviewer could
be in agreement on basic concepts and standards of "top influentials"; and that
by asking 'who is the most influential, ' the assumption was that there was a
small elite. The result is that such research is biased towards finding a
30
monolithic power structure.
It is commonly recognized that the equivalently significant word by
political scientists in community power analysis to the Hunter work Is Dahl’s
Who Governs
. Dahl's approach, unlike Hunter's, introduced the 'pluralists
alternative' or the decision-making approach to the study of community power.
^
Dahl thought that by investigating the process through which decisions are
made, it was possible to more effectively discover the locus of power. Thus
his methodology required the selection of 'key' issues; the identification of
people who took part in the decision-making process; and account of the
actual behavior of individuals w hile the issue -conflict was being resolved; and
the determination and analysis of specific outcomes. With this technique, Dahl
°^In addition to the sources in footnote 29, see Nelson W. Polsby,
Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963), and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1960).
31
Dahl, ibid .
16
found that, at least, in New Haven, there was no identifiable monolithic power
elite, but many elites, that is a pluralism of elites which were executive-
centered. In addition, Dahl found that the influence of each elite changed with
each issue under consideration.
The publication of Who Governs sparked another flurry of articles and
books in which political scientists utilized the decision-making approach."^
However, fundamental and important criticisms of the pluralist model were
33
also raised. For instance, Bachrach and Baratz were concerned with the
^Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961); Heinz Eulau, "A Review of Who Governs ? M American
Political Science Review
,
57 (March, 1962), 144-45; H. Douglas Price, "A
Review of Who Governs ? ,; Political Science Quarterly
,
77 (June, 1962), 269-71;
Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory
,
op
.
cit
. ;
Wallace S.
Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1960; Paul A. Smith, "The Great Game of Community
Politics, " Midwest Journal of Political Science
,
9 (February, 1965); Wolfinger,
op
. cit . ; Scoble, ojd. cit. ; Norton Long, "The Local Community As an Ecology
of Games, " o£. cit
. ;
Roscoe Martin and Frank Munger, et. al.
,
Decisions in
Syracuse (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).
33
However, some fundamental criticisms of the pluralist alternative
are found in the following sources: Thomas Anton, 0£. cit.; Anton, "Rejoinder
Letters to the Editors, " Administrative Science Quarterly , 7 (September, 1963),
257-68; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions:
An Analytical Framework, " American Political Science Review , 57 (September,
1963), 632-42; Ibid.
,
"Two Faces of Power. " Administrative Science Quarterly ,
6 (March, 1962), 517-19. Some research in community power areas has been
criticized for being ideological. See these articles for this type of criticism:
Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, "American
Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 285-295; and Robert A. Dahl,
"Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy'", American
Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 296-305.
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question of "nondecision. " They argued that by focusing on the processes of
decision-making, the pluralists ignore the pervasive extra-processes by which
issues are also resolved and the results brought to bear on the formal process.
Thus, they asked whether "the researcher over-looked the chance that some
person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial
matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals,
not withstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power
34
conflict. " The pluralist approach requires that 'key issues' are selected.
But, what are the criteria for determining the 'key issues' ? Is it those issues
that are most controversial, salient, popular at the moment, or of interest to
to the researcher? Dahl does not in his study of New Haven define what he
means by 'key issues'. Thomas Anton criticized the pluralist for placing
undue emphasis on individual power in an attempt to measure community
35
power.
In recent studies of community power, an attempt has been made to
36
synthesize parts of the decisional and reputational approaches.
0
’ This
34Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power, " ibid .
35
"Power, Pluralism and Local Politics, " op. cit.
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6
Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Robert E. Agger, Daniel
Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John
Wiley, 1964); Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (New Jersey:
18
synthesis has led to a different way of looking at community power-comparative
community study.
Linton Freeman and his associates studied leadership in the Syracuse
metropolitan area by comparing the different methods for finding leadership.
Since the type of leaders discovered depended to a large extent on the methodo-
logical approach, Freeman and his colleagues concluded that "the various
differing approaches to the study of community leadership seem to uncover
different types of leaders. The study of reputation, position or organizational
participation seems to get at the "Institutional leaders." Studies of participa-
tion in decision-making, on the other hand, tap the "Effectors" of community
action. And studies of social activity seem to seek out the "Activists" who
37
gain entry by dent of sheer commitment, time and energy.
Bedninster Press, 1964); M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials (New
York: The Free Press, 1964); Linton C. Freeman, et. al. "Locating Leaders
in Local Communities: A Comparison of Some Alternative Approaches, "
American Sociological Review
,
28 petober, 1963), 791-798. For another
theoretical scheme, see Rossi, "Power and Community Structure, " o£. cit.
37 Linton Freeman, ibid .
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Men at the Top0 8 by Presthus is a study of two small communities in
New \ork, Edgewood and Riverview. A series of decisions were studied using
both the decisional and reputational methodological approaches. Presthus
assumed "that the decisional method would prove to be superior to the older
reputational method, " but after deciding to compare his findings by each
approach, he realized the "both methods had something to contribute. Each
had its peculiar strengths and weaknesses. 1,39 He found political leaders
dominant in Riverview and economic leaders taking the initiative in Edgewood.
But, Presthus felt that the reputational method should not be used independently
and that some of the assumptions of pluralism were not supported by his
findings, e,g.
,
"the expected measure of individual and organizational
participation in major decisions. " However, in testing both methodological
approaches, Presthus concluded that "each method, in effect became a foil
against which the evidence provided by the other could be tested and modified.
It soon became clear that the reputationalmethod had a great deal to contribute
in refining the somewhat gross power ascriptions provided by the decisional
technique.
O Q
Robert Presthus, o£. cit.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
,
59.
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Wildavsky's study of Oberlin, Ohio was undertaken to replicate Dahl's
New Haven study and also, like Presthus, to prove the superiority of the
decisional approach. He studied all major decisions in a given period. Based
on his findings, Wildavsky saw the reputational method as having a fifty-fifty
chance in not naming the 'leaders'. Therefore, in testing both methodological
approaches, Wildavsky selects the decisional as being more effective in naming
the leaders and concludes that the pluralist model is representative of most
cities in the United States.
M. Kent Jenning's Community Influentials4
1
is a re -study of Atlanta
in order to check on Hunter's findings. Jennings, however, used both the
decisional and reputational approaches. Based on his investigation, Jennings
did not find an elite structure in Atlanta, especially, a dominant economic elite.
In the Rulers and the Ruled, Agger and his associates attempted a
more systematic approach to the study of community leadership by devising
typologies of power structures and 'regimes'. The four types of power
structures which they delineated were consensual mass and consensual elites
and competitive mass and competitive elites. Consensual and competitive
represented the extent of ideological agreement or disagreement, while mass
41
Jennings, 0£. cit.
4 p
Agger, et. al., o£. cit.
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and elite referred to the breath of participation. In studying changes in the
decision-making process over a period of fifteen years in two western and
two southern cities, Agger and his colleagues found that both the reputational
and decisional approaches could be effective in studying community leadership.
In summary as the study of community leadership has advanced,
political scientists have become more systematic in their investigation and
have attempted to devise theoretical schemes and models in an effort to
better understand community power.
Structure, Process, Environment and Policy Outcomes
Research in state and local politics witnessed a marked innovation in
the i960 's with political scientists attempting to show a relationship between
various political and socio-economic variables and certain policy outcomes.
Hypothesizing that policy outputs are, in part, a function of the political-
socio-economic environment, political scientists, utilizing aggregate data and
multivariate analysis, have found positive correlations between such public
policies as taxation and expenditures and the political-socio-economic environ
ment. However, there have been few attempts on the local level, employing
aggregate voter turnout as an outcome of the political-socio-economic environ
f 43ment.
43studies which comparatively examine voter turnout in substantial
number of cities are: Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile,"
Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association,
1963), 95; and Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American
Cities, " American Political Science Review , 62 (September, 1963, 796.
22
Literature On State Policy Outcomes
This research innovation has been most noticeable in its application
44
to state government. But, such research findings has also been instructive
to the study of urban politics.
44Two early works were V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and
Nation (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951) and Duane Lockard, New England State
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). An initial systematic
study was that of Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State
Political Party Strength,” Western Political Quarterly
,
11 (1958), 494-513;
Studies which have posited environmental factors as important are: Richard
E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic
Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States, ” Journal of Politics,
25 (May, 1963), 265-289; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public
Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American
States, " APSR
,
60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental
Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy, " Midwest Journal of
Political Science
,
11 (August, 1967), 353-380; Ira Sharkansky, "Economic
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies
and Deviant Cases, " Midwest Journal of Political Science
,
11 (May, 1967),
173-92; Thomas Dye, Political, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes
in the American States
,
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, The
Politics of Taxing and Spending (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
,
1969); Ira
Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics
and Public Policy, " APSR
,
63 (September, 1969), 867-879. Studies which have
emphasized political factors are: Herbert Jacob, "The Consequence of
Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," Social Forces , 43 (December, 1964),
256-61; Thomas Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States, "
Journal of Politics
,
27 (August, 1965), 586-601; John H. Fenton, People and
Parties in Polities (Glenview, III. : Scott Foresman and Co. , 1966); Charles F.
Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in
American States, " American Political Science Review , 63 (September. 1969),
858-868; Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs, " in Oliver
Garceau (ed. ), Political Research and Political Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), 190-220; Glen W. Fisher, 'Interstate Variation in
State and Local Government Expenditure, " in Robert E. Crews, Jr., State
Politics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. , 1968), 501-519.
One article offers ways of measuring non-expenditure legislation, e.g., Civil
rights legislation: Charles F. Cnudde and Donald McCrone, On Measuiing
Public Policy, " in Robert E. Crews, Jr. , (ed. ), State Politics (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. , 1968), 523-530.
23
In the state literature, Key, Lockard and Fenton have concluded that the
degree of party competition contributes to a variation in the type of public
policies. Key in his study of southern politics found that multifactional one-
party systems correlated highly in a positive way with conservative policies
which favored those at the upper end of the socio-economic strata; bifactional
competitive systems, on the other hand, were related to liberal policies which
favored the poorer or lower classes. Lockard discovered similar correlations
in one party and two-party competitive systems respectively in his study of
New England state politics. Fenton also discovered that greater expenditures
for welfare and education existed in those states with two-party competition
rather than a one-party system.
On investigating welfare policies, Dawson and Robinson, utilizing
measures of inter-party competition and urbanization, income, industrialization
and ethnicity, discovered that the socio-economic factors had more of an
415
impact on policies than did political factors. Their findings have been
46
corroborated by Dye, Hofferbert and Sharkansky. In each case, these
researchers have used socio-economic characteristics as independent variables;
have used welfare and education policies as dependent variables; and have
concentrated on taxation and expenditures as measures of these policies.
AC
Dawson and Robinson, op. cit.
4C
Dye, Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit.
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However, many important policies cannot be measured in terms of expenditures
and taxation. McCrone and Cnudde have, for instance attempted to demonstrate
how civil rights legislation can be examined. 47
The measures of inter-party competition have also come under attack.
Inter-party competition has usually been defined as percentage of vote for
particular offices received by each party; length of control of office and whether
or not control was divided between the parties. Sharkansky and Hofferbert
have stated that "electoral balance or alternation in office is not 'inter-party
48
competition' except in the most mechanical sense. " They attempted, in
their study, to conceptually clarify inter-party competition and the ways in
which it is measured.
Thus the literature of public policies is instructive for what it omits as
for what it includes. Particular socio-economic and political factors have
been chosen for a variety of reasons. Important variables were probably
omitted which resulted in magnifying the significance of those variables
included. Based upon their research, Sharkansky and Hofferbert concluded
that "There is no single answer to the question: 'Is it politics or economics
that has the greatest impact on public policy ?' The answer varies with the
47
McCrone and Cnudde, "On Measuring Public Policies, " 0£. cit.
4
8
Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics,
and Public Policy, " q£. ait. , 867.
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49dimensions of each phenomena that are at issue. " A similar sentiment was
echoed by James Clarke when he noted that "it is probable and certainly worthy
of further research that the explanatory importance of socio-economic and
political process variables will vary with the type of policy being considered. "50
Literature on Urban Policy Outcomes
Beginning in early I960, researchers began to explore the significance
that governmental structures had upon certain urban policy areas. Some of
the initial literature posited a relationship between structural variables and
5
1
environmental factors, i.e., socio-economic characteristics. These studies
have concluded that young, medium-size, white, high socio-economic status,
low ethnic and rapidly growing cities are more likely to have council-manager
governments than cities with opposite characteristics. The assumption in
49
Ibid.
,
878.
^James W. Clarkes, "Environment, Process and Policy, " American
Political Science Review
,
63 (December, 1969), 1181.
51
John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment:
A Statistical Note about American Cities, " American Political Science Review ,
56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of
Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs, " Administrative
Science Quarterly
, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17. Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
"Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Cities," The Municipal Year
Book
,
(Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Edgar
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and Council Manager Plan, " Public Admini
-
stration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; and Phillip Cutright, Nlon-
partisan Electoral Systems in American Cities, " Comparative Studies in
Society and History , 5 (January, 1963), 212-226.
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this analysis is that cities which are inhabited by people of a certain socio-
economic mold will experience a demand on the part of these people for the
establishment of a particular kind of governmental arrangement. However,
because governmental structures are more or less static and have endured
over decades while environmental factors fluctuate, it could be that people
with certain socio-economic characteristics, preferring a particular type of
government locate in cities which have that type of governmental arrangement.
The linkage between structural variables and socio-economic factors
have been statistically demonstrated, but these correlations must be tempered
by the fact that cities are not always free to choose their structures of govern-
ment because of state requirements and because of individual political behavior
of city inhabitants. These are intervening variables which are sometimes
overlooked.
There have been several studies which have attempted to relate govern-
mental structure and socio-economic characteristics to various policy
outcomes.
52
Utilizing socio-economic characteristics as the independent
52Maurice Pinard "Structural Attachments and Political Support in
Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums, " American Journal of
Sociology
,
68 (March, 1963), 513-526; Amos Hawley, "Community Power and
Urban Renewal Success, " American Journal of Sociology , 68 (January, 1963),
422-431; Sherbenou, ojd. cit . ; Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain,
"Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation
Decisions, " Journal of Politics
,
28 (February, 1966), 169-196; Robert L.
Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American
Cities, " American Political Science Review , 61 (September, 1967), 701-716,
27
variables, governmental structures as the intervening variables, and policy
outcomes as the dependent variables, researchers have endeavored to
demonstrate the impact of various socio-economic factors upon different
policy areas. Policy areas most often employed in analysis have been welfare,
education, taxation, fluoridation and urban renewal.
Rosenthal and Crain explored the impact of political structures upon
fluoridation decisions in over three-hundred cities. They found that the mayor's
position on fluoridation largely decides the outcome. Fluoridation has a
better chance of success if supported by the mayor or a strong manager.
Rosenthal and Crain also concluded that fluoridation is more likely to be adopted
if "the political structures provide the mechanisms through forms of govern-
ment and strong parties which insulate mayors and managers from 'irregular'
pressures likely to arise on this issue; and that there is a low level of direct
citizen participation both as a general rule and specifically on the fluoridation
Thomas R. Dye "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment and Educational
Policy, " Midwest Journal of Political Science
,
11 (August, 1967), 353-380;
Robert Lineberry, "Public Policies in American Cities, " (Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, microfilmed, University of North Carolina, 1966); Joseph Cepuran,
"Policy Outputs in Council-Manager and Non-Council Manager Cities, "
Perspectives in Council Manager Government , (Iowa, University of Iowa, 1969).
For articles relating other factors to policy areas not commonly studied see:
James Wilson, City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1968). For a review of some of the literature on public policies see:
Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities, " Journal of Politics,
29 (February, 1967), 94-108.
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decision. " Maurice Pinard, on the other hand, investigated the relationship
between the community's socio-economic characteristics and fluoridation
referenda.' His findings led to the conclusions that fluoridation referenda
are more successful in a small homogeneous, low unemployment, non-middle -
class community.
It is obvious that the difference in findings of the two studies is a
function of the factors which are defined as independent variables. If, for
example, instead of political structures as independent variables, socio-
economic factors are defined as the independent variables and in place of
socio-economic factors as intervening variables, political structures are
classified as intervening variables, with fluoridation remaining the dependent
variable, it is likely that the findings of each study would be similar for the
same community. That is, communities in which a mayor favored fluoridation
and there was less citizen participation were likely to be small, homogeneous,
low unemployment and non-middle-class.
Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler investigated the impact of
55
political structures on policy-making in cities over 50,000 population. Two
policy outputs - taxation and expenditure - were related to the socio-economic
J
^Rosenthal and Crain, o£. cit.
,
196.
54
Pinard, cit .
55
op . cit.
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and structural characteristics of cities. The structural characteristics
utilized - form of government, type of constituency and partisanship of
elections - were divided into reformed and unreformed institutions. Reformed
institutions were manager government, non-partisanship and at large
elections, while unreformed institutions included mayor-council government,
partisanship and ward elections. They discovered that, with the exception of
expenditures in partisan, mayor-council cities, reformed cities spend and tax
less than unreformed cities. Consequently, Lineberry and Fowler were able
to conclude that reformed governments are less responsive to the conflicts
and cleavages of politics.
Thomas Dye examined the impact of governmental structure and the
structure of the city's school system upon educational outcomes. He, then
compared the effects of these structural variables with the effects of the urban
environment, i.e., the socio-economic characteristics. Dye concluded that
the urban environment was more important than structural characteristics in
determining educational outcomes.
56Thomas Dye, o£. cit.
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In his study of Chicago suburbs, Edgar Sherbenou concluded that higher
expenditures, higher property taxes, and a more conservative attitude towards
debt were associated with the council-manager form of government. 0 ^ This
correlation is partially explained by the middle -class make-up of council-
manager cities in which the inhabitants are usually wealthy and can afford and
have the willingness to support policies involving high taxation and expenditures.
However, Lineberry and Fowler found ’’reformed, " i.e., council-manager
governments, less responsive to community characteristics on taxation and
expenditure measures than ’’unreformed, ” i.e.
,
mayor-council governments.
In addition to analyzing the effects of political and socio-economic
factors upon urban policies, some researchers have studied political culture
58
and its effect upon policy outcomes. There have been problems in reaching
a common definition of political culture and also difficulty in finding suitable
measures of political culture. And even more troublesome has been the dilemma
57
Sherbenou, oja. cit .
5 ft
James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, ’’Public Regardingness as
a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, ” American Political Science Review , 58
(December, 1964), 876-887; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Lineberry and Fowler,
op
.
cit.
;
Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the
Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review , 60 (June,
1966), 306-326; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities :
A Study in Comparative Policy-making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1963).
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of linking what is considered as political culture to political behavior. However,
Williams and Adrian have advanced a four-part typology on the proper role of
local government. They defined the legitimate scope of government as:
(1) "promoting economic growth; (2) providing and securing life's amenities;
(3) maintaining traditional services and (4) arbitrating among conflicting
59
interests. ,r These roles of government are conditioned by and also a re-
flection of a particular kind of political culture.
Banfield and Wilson have shown that a public-regarding culture as
opposed to a private - regarding culture favors such policies as civil service,
city planning, and urban renewal. The public-regarding culture supposedly
embody a "middle -class ethos" in which the concern is for the community as
a whole, not the neighborhood as is implicit in the "immigrant ethos" of the
private -regarding culture. Therefore, for Banfield and Wilson, ethnicity was
the most important variable in defining the expenditure pattern of local
60
government. Lineberry and Fowler felt that it is possible for political
culture to become institutionalized and affect taxation and expenditure measures
69
Williams and Adrian, o£. cit .
60However, Wolfinger and Field tested the "ethos theory" and found
that it is "irrelevant in the South. . . fares badly in the Northeast. . . inapplicable
to the West. . . and the Midwest provides the best evidence for the "ethos
theory, " but even there the differences between public-regarding and private-
regarding cities are small and uneven, " ojo. cit.
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in that manner. Once political culture becomes institutionalized, community
characteristics, e.g.
,
ethnicity, are less important than political characteristics
in policy outcomes. 61 It is clear that there is no definitive or final answer on
the role of political culture, which at best calls for further analysis.
Summary
The foregoing analysis points out the fact that political scientists have
at last discovered the urban scene as a genuine and fruitful area for systematic
research. By moving into the area of policy outcomes, political scientists move
closer to answering Harold Lasswell's dictum about politics: "Who Gets What,
When and How" and we might add "Why. " However, there are many other areas
of local politics which clamor for systematic analysis and explanation. One of
these areas is the subject of the present study - comparative municipal voter
turnout analysis. This review reveals that substantial systematic comparative
analysis of municipal voter turnout has not been conducted. As suggested
earlier, the present study is an attempt to partially alleviate this unfortunate
state of affairs.
61Lineberry and Fowler, (New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.
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CHAPTER II
MUNICIPAL VOTER TURNOUT DETERMINANTS:
REVIEW, CONCEPTS, HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY
Review
In a classic analysis of parties and pressure groups in the American
political system, V. O. Key observed that "most studies of electoral participa-
tion have been microscopic; they focus on the individual and attempt to identify
the characteristics or the motives that lead him to vote or not to vote. 1 Key
further suggested that even though these studies are of great value, "they throw
little light on the larger question of the relation between the extent and nature of
citizen participation and the character of the political system in the large. "2
Although Key's challenge was directed towards encouraging scholars to engage
in cross-national analyses of electoral participation, there is also an implicit
challenge for scholars to study comparatively electoral participation in local as
well as state and national elections in the United States.
IV. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed. ; New York
Thomas Y. Crowell Co„
,
1964), 591.
2
Ibid.
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Cross-national and national analyses of electoral participation are now
relatively plentiful. 3 But, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a paucity of
comparative studies of electoral participation at the local level with only one
study dealing comparatively with participation in local elections. 4
The primary aim of this study is to continue the research trend in
comparative analysis of voter participation in local elections as this participation
relates to the political and social structures of the community. Lee and Alford
accurately point out that "although a number of important studies of politics and
3Some works in cross -national research are: Stein Rokkan, "Cross-
National Studies in Political Participation, " International Social Science Journal,
12 (1960), 7-14; Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell, "Citizen Participation in
Political Life: Norway and the United States of America, " ibid
.
,
69-99; Sidney
Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study,"
Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962), 22-42. Some national studies are: Angus Campbell,
The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Bernard Berelson,
Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1954); Eugene Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (eds„), American Voting
Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1959); Warren Miller, "The Political
Behavior of the American Electorate, " American Government Annual 1960-61
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); and Angus Campbell, "Voters and
Elections: Past and Present, " Journal of Politics
,
26 (1964).
4Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities, "
American Political Science Review
,
62 (September, 1968), 796. For a review
of the literature on local elections, see Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Ziegler,
Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.
,
1964).
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elections have emerged in recent years, the data are far from sufficient to
permit more than the most speculative generalizations about the nature of the
local electorate.
Comparative Municipal Election Literature
There have been a number of municipal election studies, but they
concentrated on investigating elections on a small scale, i.e.
,
studying a
certain aspect of elections in one, two or three cities on a comparative basis,
but more frequently a single election was studied. 6 In the area of comparative
5 Lee and Alford, 0£. cit.
6 Some of these studies are: Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), Chap. 4; Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior
in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: University of
California, Bureau of Governmental Research, 1953); G. W. Pearson,
"Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election, " Public Opinion Quarterly
,
12 (1948),
112-117; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Non-Partisan Municipal
Elections, " Public Opinion Quarterly
,
30 (Spring, 1966), 79; James A.
Robinson and William H. Stanley, "Some Correlates of Voting Behavior: The
Case of Indiana, " Journal of Politics
,
22 (February, 1960), 96-111; Robert
Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan
Elections: The Case of DesMoines, " American Political Science Review , 57
(September, 1963), 584-592; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "Insulation
of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot, " American Political Science
Review, 53 (December, 1959), 1052-1063.
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municipal elections on a large scale, there is a dearth of studies. In an early
n
study Eugene Lee did basically a statistical review of elections in 574 cities with
populations over 25,000. Data was obtained through questionnaires on registra-
tion, voting, nominating practices and turnover of elected officials. This data
was then classified by partisan and nonpartisan elections and by the three major
forms of municipal government. The basic purpose of the review according to
Lee were twofold: (1) to provide data by which city elections can be compared
with elections at other governmental levels; and (2) to attempt, tentatively, to
assess the impact of various local governmental institutions upon the city
election process. With the compilation of this pertinent, but fundamental data,
Lee set the state for further research in this area. The analysis which is
undertaken in this study conforms, in part, to Lee's second purpose.
In the second study, Lee in collaboration with Robert Alford examined
O
comparatively, voter turnout in 729 cities above 25,000 population. This was
the first comprehensive study of municipal elections on a comparative basis.
The basic thesis that the authors examined was that voter turnout is related to
the political and social structure of the local community. Lee and Alford
7 Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile, " Municipal Year
Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1963), 95.
^Lee and Alford, o£. cit, 796.
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concluded that "cities with partisan elections, mayor-council (or non-manager)
government, high ethnicity, low education, low mobility, and eastern location,
tend to have a higher voting turnout than cities with nonpartisan elections,
council-manager government, low ethnicity, high education, high mobility and
far western location. "
9
But, they issued a warning to those who would be prone
to accept this conclusion at face value. They said, "While relationships are
suggested between turnout, political and governmental structure, and character-
istics of the population, these relationships must be regarded more as leads to
future research than as clear and unambiguous findings. "-*-0 it is partially on the
basis of this statement that the findings of Lee and Alford are used as a founda-
tion for the present study. It is the intention of this study that the conclusions
and findings reached by Lee and Alford be subject to further test.
Concepts
Political participation involves a multiplicity of factors. It is not simply
the act of voting. Participation by the electorate may include such things as the
discussion of public issues, financial contributions to political causes, working
in campaigns, influencing friends and acquiring information about candidates.
And the extent to which these and other activities are engaged in by the electorate
9
Ibid.
,
809.
10
Ibid., 796.
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also seems to depend on the differences in the nature of the political system.
Since the political system defines and channels the various political acts which
the electorate is allowed to perform, 11 it is little surprise, then, that partici-
pation by the electorate varies widely from one election to the next and from
one political system to another.
Although political participation encompasses any one of a number of
factors, the major political act utilized as the basis of this study is voter
turnout. "Voting turnout in local elections is the most direct measure of
participation in the electoral process and possibly an indication of other forms
of political participation. " l2 Voter turnout may be influenced by numerous
factors and circumstances. Variation in these factors may result in variation
in the pattern of voter turnout in any given election in any given city. For
instance, empirical evidence has supported the notion that turnout is higher in
national elections than in local elections and that "no contest" elections will
^For discussion on municipal political systems, see Chapter III.
12
Lee and Alford, 0£. cit . , 797.
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13
result in low turnout. ° When elections for local officials are held at a time
different from that for national or state officials, turnout will usually be low. 14
Voter turnout is also influenced by the nature of the party system. ^
There are numerous other idiosyncratic factors associated with any
given election which may affect voter turnout rate. Some of these are the
perceived closeness of a contest by the electorate; the excitement brought on by
13
' Roscoe Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study, "
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly
,
14 (December, 1933), 193-237; Charles
H. Titus, "Voting in California Cities, 1900-1925, " Southwestern Political and
Social Science Quarterly
, 8 (March, 1928), 383-399; James K. Pollock, Voting
Behavior: A Case Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Bureau of
Government Research, (1939); Angus Campbell, et_aL_, The American Voter, op cit.
;
Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); Lester Milbraith,
Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.
,
1965); and Thomas Dye,
Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
,
1969), Chap. 9; Key, o£. cit. ; Lawrence O'Rourke, o£. cit .
44 Campbell, The American Voter ; Lane, Political Life ; Milbraith,
Political Participation
;
Dye, Politics in States and Communities; Key, Politics
,
Parties and Pressure Groups .
^Campbell, The American Voter ; Lester Milbraith, "Political
Participation in the States, " in Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth Vines (eds.),
Comparative State Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. , 1965), Chap. 2;
Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled
(New York: John Wiley & Son, Inc., 1964); Lane, Political Life , pp. 312-314;
Berelson, Voting ; Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Competitive Pressures
and Domestic Consent, " in Heinz Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz
(eds.), Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 275-286;
and John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, III. : Scott,
Foresman Co., 1966).
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the campaign; the issues; and the personality of the candidates. 16 Two other
factors of primary significance also affecting voter turnout rate are the demo-
graphic or socio-economic makeup of the community and the structural
17
characteristics of the government.
Admittedly, there are numerous ways of measuring turnout. In this
study, voter turnout is measured on the basis of the proportion of the potential
electorate actually voting, i.e.
,
on the proportion of citizens twenty-one years
1 o
of age and over voting. ° Consequently, included in the potential electorate
are persons who fail to meet the technical qualifications for voting. For example,
many cannot meet the residence requirement, or some have lost the privilege
of voting through criminal conviction or of being confined in institutions.
However, the use of voter registration as a measure of turnout would similarly
be accompanied by problems. For example, states have different laws and
mechanisms for registration, which make registration more difficult in one
state than another. Therefore, the number of persons registered and the percent
^Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change, "
Public Opinion Quarterly
,
24 (1960), 397-418; Campbell, The American Voter ,
Chap. 4; Alford and Scoble, Bureaucracy and Participation, op . cit .
17
Lee and Alford, 0£. cit .
18States with a lower age eligibility are not part of this study.
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of persons voting may actually be, in part, a reflection of the ease or difficulty
of registration. ^
Hypotheses
The basic hypothesis of this study is that form of government, type of
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout
rates
.
The forms of government used as the basis for analysis in this study are
the mayor-council and the council-manager. The commission form of local
government has been omitted because there were too few commission cities in
the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The types of electoral system are
partisan and nonpartisan. The legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is
utilized, i.e.
,
whether or not the party affiliation of the candidate appears on
the ballot, not whether there exists any actual party activity. The socio-economic
characteristics are divided into three categories: (1) population growth and
mobility, (2) population homogeneity, and (3) social class. Population growth
and mobility refer to percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants
19Campbell, The American Voter , op . cit.
,
276-282; Stanley Kelley, Jr.,
Richard Ayers, and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting
First Things First, " American Political Science Review , 61 (June, 1967), 374.
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from different county, respectively. Population homogeneity refers to the
percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born persons and
percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage). Social class refers to
occupation, education, homeownership, and income.
Subsidiary Hypotheses
A related subsidiary hypothesis of this study is that form of govern-
9 1
ment is related to socio-economic characteristics
.
Because earlier studies
have found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-
economic environment, it is necessary to re-examine their findings as form of
government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being
related to voter turnout. Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relation-
ship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic
characteristics should be provided.
20
For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public
Administration Review
,
21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role
of Social Class in American Voting Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly , 26
(March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of
Local Political Involvement, " American Sociological Review (December, 1968).
“^Derived from works of Kessel, op . cit. ; Schnore and Alford, o£. cit.
Alford and Scoble, ojd. cit, ; and Lee and Alford, ojd. cit.
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Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses to be investigated:
1. Manager governments are likely to manifest a more rapid
population growth and population mobility than mayor -
council governments.
2. Manager governments more than mayor-council governments
are likely to have a higher percentage of college -educated
persons, a higher percentage of white-collar workers, a
lower percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less, a
higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or more,
and a higher percentage of homeowners.
3. Mayor-council governments are likely to be located in
communities with higher non-white and a higher ethnic
population than manager governments.
Basic Hypothesis
Subsequent to the analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the
basic hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government,
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated. The
specific propositions are:
1, The mayor-council form of government is more likely to
encourage and witness greater voter participation and
turnout than manager governments. 2 "
22 Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1960); and Lee and Alford, 0£. cit.
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2. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections
exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus,
nonpartisanship has the tendency to reduce voter turnout. 23
3. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan
elections are combined with the mayor-council form of
government than where other combinations of electoral
24
systems and forms of government exist.
4. Cities with rapid population growth and high mobility
will experience low voter turnout.
5. Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the per-
centage of well-educated (college) persons in the
population increases.
6. Voter turnout is likely to be higher in those cities with
a higher percentage of white-collar employees, home-
owners, and a higher percentage of high income persons
than in cities with high percentages of opposite character-
istics.
7. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high
percentage of non-white population.
8. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with high ethnic
population (i.e.
,
foreign born and population of native-
mixed parentage).
23 Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship , op . cit.
2
^Lee and Alford, op . cit .
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Methodology
This study is an offshoot of a larger, more comprehensive study.
Although the present study is a study of voter turnout in American cities, all
cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis. A random sample of
cities in four states was drawn. These four states are California, Illinois, New
York and Texas. These particular states were chosen because: (1) each has
a large number of cities with over 100,000 population; and because (2) they
represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West, North Central,
Northeast and South, respectively. This does not mean, necessarily, that each
state is "representative” of other states in that region.
The cities range in population size from 5,000 to 250,000. To facilitate
the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of 5,000-10,000,
10,001-50,000, and 50,001-250,000. In each of these categories a maximum
sample of 75 cities was drawn. In cases where the maximum sample could not
be drawn, all cities for that population size were utilized. The total number of
cities came to 558, from which data for cities were able to be included in the
actual study.
^Under the direction of Irving Howards, Professor of Government,
University of Massachusetts (Amherst), and Henry Brehm, Chief, Survey
Operations, Division of Disability Studies, Office of Research and Statistics,
Social Security Administration. This Health, Education and Welfare-sponsored
project was undertaken to investigate the relationship between demographic and
political variables and public policy outputs in American cities.
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It is necessary to clarify a number of points concerning the data:26
1. As there is no national agency which collects voter turnout
information on American cities, questionnaires were sent
to each city in the study requesting voter turnout statistics. 27
Response to questionnaires was over 90 percent.
2. Cities were requested to provide turnout figures from the
last two elections, between 1961 and 1968, in which either
the mayor or councilmen were elected. Where the mayor
was elected directly, total voter turnout for that office was
requested. Where the mayor was not elected directly, the
total number of council vacancies to be filled and the total
votes received by all councilmanic candidates were requested.
3. The voter turnout data are, in some instances, concurrent
with state elections, but not with national elections.
4 . The data provide no indication of the nature of the office
of mayor or manager in each city in reference to power
and the exercise of power.
5. Data on political structures, e,g., form of government
and electoral system, were obtained from the International
City Manager's Association Municipal Year Book , 1965.
Therefore, it is possible that some cities may not have
had the same political structures in 1965 as they had when
the elections were held. However, this shouldn't affect
the pattern of correlations.
6. Form of government refers to manager, mayor-council or
commission governments. Partisan and nonpartisan are
legal definitions used to refer to those electoral systems
in which party labels are permitted or not permitted on the
ballot, respectively.
26All data utilized in this study are part of the Howards-Brehm project.
27 Ibid. Questionnaires used by Howards and Brehm are in the appendix.
There was over 90 percent return on questionnaires from the cities in each
state
.
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7. Data on the social structure, e.g., occupation, education,
were obtained from the 1960 United States Census of
Population
.
Because the adult population for 1960 is used
and election figures are for 1961-68, changes in population
are not reflected. But it is hoped that the results obtained
can be useful and suggestive.
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CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Introduction
This chapter will provide a brief historical view of urban political
structures, pointing out the effect certain factors have had upon existing
structures and how new structures were devised to meet new needs and wants;
indicating the power relationships which developed with the new types of
structures in the population; emphasizing the basic feature of each structure;
and pointing up the impact that each structure has had upon urban politics. In
addition, the chapter will explore the significance of electoral systems, i.e.
,
nonpartisanship and partisan elections, as well as examine the possible linkage
between socio-economic characteristics and mayor-council and manager forms
of local government through a review of some of the literature. The ultimate
point of the chapter is to provide a clear focus and basis from which it will be
possible in the following chapter to attempt to link the ’'principles” or theories
of governmental structures and socio-economic characteristics through the
existing empirical data.
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Political Structures
Forms of Local Government
The nature of political structures apparently has some effect upon the
extent to which the electorate participates in various political activities.
Political structures define, identify, channel and restrict the sundry political
acts which the electorate is permitted to perform. Not only do political structures
guide participation, they also affect governmental performance in various
policy output areas. 1 ’It must be readily admitted that there is a close and
direct relationship between the form of government and its performances.
Richard G. Childs observed "that differences in political performance in
3
cities can be attributed to one factor - structure. "
Robert Salisbury in his study of St. Louis politics found that the structure
of local government tends to shape the goals, tactics, and behavior of local
parties, interest groups, and the political environment in which they
Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities, " Journal of
Politics
,
29 (February, 1967), 94-108; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation
Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables, "
American Political Science Review
,
60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Robert Lineberry
and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities, "
American Political Science Review
,
61 (September, 1967), 706; and Charles
Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 198.
2
George S. Blair, American Local Government (New York: Harper and
Row, 1964), 205.
^Civic Victories (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), 57.
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function. "Form and structure distribute advantages and disadvantages
among the participants, authorizing and denying, giving formal opportunities to
control areas of policy to some and denying them to others.
"
5
The structural components of government are instruments designed
primarily for facilitating the attainment of certain objectives. Among these
objectives are the provision of services and goods to the people and providing
for the overall welfare of the people. When a particular form of government
fails to adequately meet the needs and wants of the people, circumstances
dictate that it be modified or changed and that a different governmental form
be instituted. Historically, as the United States became urbanized and the
life style of the people subsequently changed, the structures of urban govern-
ment underwent alteration or modification in an effort to meet the challenges
of increased responsibilities. Each modification in the structure of govern-
ment had certain political implications for power distribution in the internal
framework of government and among the various segments of the population.
Although such modifications cannot be considered as definite determining
factors in urban political relationships, they must be given their just weight
as conditioning factors.
4Robert Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationship Among Interests,
Parties, and Governmental Structure, " Western Political Quarterly , 13 (June
1960), 498-507.
5
Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York
Macmillan Co.
,
1963), 326.
51
When the United States gained its independence in 1776, only three
percent of the population lived in urban or non-rural communities.^ The
percent of population in incorporated areas was even less. Urban political
structures were modeled after the type of system with which the colonists had
been familiar in England - the mayor-council government. However, the
specific pattern which this type of government assumed varied from one city
to another as much as it does today. But, basically the mayor had no veto
power and practically no executive power. The mayor's primary function was
that of presiding over the council. The mayor-council form of government
was the universal form prior to the twentieth century.
There emerged in the early nineteenth century, a philosophy affecting
very much the existing urban political structures. This was the philosophy of
6
Ibid.
,
71.
7 For early development of the mayor-council government, see John A.
Fairlie, Municipal Administration (New York: MacMillan Company, 1901),
Chapters 5 and 19; Frank J. Goodnow, City Government in the United States
(New York: The Century Company, 1904), Chapters 3 and 8; Ernest S.
Griffith, History of American City Government (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1938); William B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration , I
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), Chapter 19; William B. Munro, The
Government of American Cities
,
3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1920),
Chapter 1.
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Jacksonian Democracy. The principles of Jacksonian Democracy were
government by the common man and the belief that any man could hold public
office as no special qualifications were needed. This notion led to the
development of the idea of universal white manhood suffrage. These ideas were
accompanied by the view that public office-holders, as servants of the people,
should be elected, not appointed. Inevitably, a proliferation of elective offices
occurred. This practice eventually resulted in a further weakening of the
already weak powers of the mayor. Consequently, there developed by the
middle of the 19th century what is known as the "weak-mayorp an"** where
the mayor was hamstrung by Jacksonian democracy and Madisonian checks
and balances. "The structural form of this pattern still reflects the ideology
that officeholders should be many in number, have few powers, and that there
9
should be checks upon their exercise of these powers. "
Q
Arthur Bromage, Introduction to Municipal Government and Admini -
stration (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), 14-15; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1945);
Jewel Cass Phillips, Municipal Government and Administration (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1960), 19; Adrian, _op. _cit.
,
73.
*The characteristic features of the weak-mayor plan are: (1) a council
which exercises both legislative and executive powers; (2) a mayor with no
control over administration; (3) a small council; and (4) an array of boards and
commissions which are independent of each other. Basically, the mayor is
weak because he lacks administrative power and he is also restricted by the
council. This situation leads to immobilisme . These four points were taken
from Blair, o£. cit
. ,
206.
J
Ibid.
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With the municipal executive immobilized between the Scylla of
Jacksonian Democracy and the Charybdis of Madisonian checks and balances in
a period when the requirements of governmental action were increasing
geometrically, the avenue was paved for another organization to perform the
necessary (unctions of the city. Robert Merton observed that whenever formal
institutions fail to discharge their functions, informal institutions developed to
perform them. ^ The informal organization which developed was the political
machine with a boss as its leader. ^ 1 Political machines were able through
informal methods to satisfy those needs which the formal governmental structure
was prevented from doing. Sait observed that, "when the people or particular
groups among them demanded positive action, no one had adequate authority
12
to act. The machine provided an antidote. "
10
Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 111. :
Free Press, 1957), 72-82.
^For an in depth discussion of the machine and its operation see, "City
Bosses and Political Machines," The Annals (May, 1964); F. R. Kent, The
Great Game of Politics, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1923); W. L.
Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.
,
1905); Lincoln Steffens, The Same of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips
and Co., 1904); and Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States , (Durham,
N. C. : Duke University Press, 1930).
12
Edward M. Sait, "Machine, Political, " Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658.
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Although political bosses and machines have been widely vilified and
crucified, the fact remains that they did perform necessary social functions
in their day. According to Merton, the machine humanized and personalized
social welfare; afforded businesses, including illicit ones, privileges that they
needed in order to survive; provided an avenue of social mobility for persons
to whom other avenues were closed; and was the panacea to the constitutional
13
dispersal of power. The machine made extraordinary use of universal
suffrage. It increased electoral participation through seeing that every eligible
male was registered and that he voted on election day. The machines performed
services for which it expected in return the vote of the recipient on election
day.
The excesses of the political machine led to its demise and to what
14
Richard Hofstadter called an Age of Reform. Municipal government had
severely declined in prestige as a result of alleged corruption, inefficiency,
extravagance and ineptitude. For these and many other "evils, " the city boss
and the machine were indicted. Motivated by the corruption and mismanagement
in government, well meaning but inexperienced reformers ,rbegan their efforts
13
Merton, ^jp. cit. Also see Adrian, ojd. cit. , 147-150.
"^Vintage Books, (New York, 1955).
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to reclaim city government from the boss and the political machine as early
15
as the 1870's. " The ills of city government were diagnosed by the reformers
as a natural result of a structure of government which recruited those persons
who were susceptible to corruption. The reformers argued that the governmental
structure which existed in the cities were those designed for a rural setting with
its intimate relationship and that for a complex urban environment, the old
political structures were an anachronism, that such structures did not
effectively deal with the monumental and difficult tasks accompanying urbani-
zation, and that consequently a political boss could easily capture city govern-
ment and bring minimum order of the existing administrative chaos.
In an effort to "return government to the people" and make it accountable
to them, a national movement of municipal reform was founded. With the
founding of the National Municipal League in 1894, the movement was coordinated
under that organization. This was a movement spearheaded by the aroused
middle-class whose primary goals were eliminating corruption, increasing
efficiency, bringing some measure of economy to local government and making
local government more democratic. The reformers were guided by a middle-
class ethos or ideology "which sees politics as a means of moralizing life and
15Adrian, op. cit.
,
79.
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which attaches great importance to the individuals’ obligation to 'serve' the
16
public. " The reformers conceptualized their program as: (1) putting the
electorate in the position to assert its will despite professional politicians;
(2) simplifying the voters' tasks, improving his information and exhorting him
to his civic duty; (3) checking the tide of immigration; and (4) separating the
"business" of city government from state and national politics; (5) weakening
the power of neighborhoods and other partial interests; and (6) strengthening
17
the executive. The reformers assumed that the structures of government could
be so manipulated that "good people" would control the government. They
believed that reformed structures would allow government to run like a
corporation, e.g.
,
on the basis of scientific management and administrative
efficiency. Reform was manifested in two basic ways: (1) "through efforts
to 'throw the rascals out' and to put honest men in office and (2) through efforts
to improve the structure of municipal government and to increase administrative
efficiency.
But, the reformers belatedly realized that even if they did elect "good"
men as mayors and councilmen, these officials were still hamstrung by the
l6
Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), 139.
17
Ibid.
,
140-141.
1 8
Harold A. Stone, Don Price and Kathryn Stone, City Manager Govern-
ment in the United States, (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), 3.
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existing systems of government. The leaders of the reform movement were
subsequently aware of the fact that the structures of local government could
prevent political and administrative reforms and they therefore attempted to
devise a form not amenable to control by party.
In response to the demand for a modern type of government - a govern-
ment which was capable of meeting the exigencies of a complex urban environ-
ment, the reformers proposed, in the first reform, the strong-mayor-council
19
plan. A version of this plan was first put into effect in Brooklyn in 1880.
The mayor was invested with the sole power to appoint and dismiss department
heads. For the first time, there was an integrated administrative structure.
Virtually complete control for administrative responsibility was in the hands
of the mayor. The mayor shared policy-making with the council. Further-
more, he was completely responsible for his budget.
The strong-mayor plan was so successful in Brooklyn that it subsequently
was adopted in New York City, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, and San
19
Technically, this form is not considered a reformed structure. But,
because it was an effective alternative to the old weak-mayor plan, it is inserted
at this point. For discussion of reformed and unreformed structures see Robert
Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, ’'Reformism and Public Policies in American
Cities, ” American Political Science Review , 61 (September, 1967), 706.
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Francisco. The reformers considered the strong-mayor plan a much more
pragmatic and organized approach to the problems of urbanization. This plan
was conducive to the satisfaction of the particular ethnic, neighborhood interests
in the city for voters voted for a mayor who shared their policy preferences.
The mayor was quite aware of this quid pro quo relationship and governed
accordingly. With the diversity of interests represented in the city the strong-
mayor plan seemed most amenable to their articulation and satisfaction.
However, the strong-mayor form of government had many weaknesses.
Although the mayor had the authority to utilize sound principles and techniques
of management and to appoint and remove subordinates without interference,
he was somewhat circumscribed by obligations he had incurred during his
election. Debts to individuals, parties and various groups were paid in the
form of appointments and other favors which severely limited the performance
level of the government. Furthermore, the electorate very often elected an
amateur rather than professional administrator. Lastly, the strong-mayor plan
failed to effect a separation between politics and administration which was
thought to be necessary for an efficient, economical, and impartial administration.
However, the strong-mayor plan presently predominates in large urban and
metropolitan areas.
The notion of improving municipal government through the utilization of
business techniques and principles was more closely applied in the development
59
of the commission plan in the first decade of the twentieth century. The
commission plan grew out of an unusual circumstance in the city of Galveston,
Texas. In September, 1900, a hurricane all but destroyed the city and in the
process of rebuilding the city, local government was suspended by the state
legislature. This was done because it was necessary to dispense with the red
tape of dealing with the local councilmanic body of fifty-four members. William
Munro observed that "while the city lay prostrate its elective officers fell to
wrangling among themselves over the awarding of contracts for clearing away
20
the ruins. " Substituted in place of the mayor-council government was a
21
temporary government of five local businessmen - the Galveston Commission.
This commission stabilized the situation and got the city on its feet. In 1903
in a new charter, an effort was made to retain the commission system since it
had been extremely effective. The charter called for a commission composed
of five members - three appointed by the governor and two elected by the
people. This procedure was ruled unconstitutional by the court, but the
legislature subsequently authorized that all commissioners be elective.
20
William B. Munro, City Government by Commission (New York: D.
Appleton and Co.
,
1914), 13-14.
91
For detailed information on the commission see Munro, Ibid , and T. S.
Chang, History and Analysis of the Commission Municipal Government in the
United States (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1918).
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Consequently, the commission form of government was launched as a new
type of governmental structure to deal with the problem of urbanization.
Because of the tremendous success of the commission plan in Galveston,
other cities were soon attracted to it. Houston, which faced a financial crisis
because of mismanagement quickly adopted the plan. But, not only did other
cities in Texas adopt the commission structure of government, cities in other
parts of the country adopted it. In Des Moines such reform devices as non-
partisan elections, referendum, initiative and recall were added. By 1910,
108 cities had gravitated towards the commission system and the number
increased to 500 by 1917.
However, following 1917, a dramatic shift took place as municipal
reformers lost interest in the commission form of government and its use
subsequently declined. This decline might be accounted for, in part, by the
creation of the council-manager system of government in 1914 and its subsequent
popularity. Many cities which abandoned the commission plan switched to the
22
council-manager plan.
The following table provides a brief picture of the decline of the commission
government between the years 1941-1968.
22
"" Adrian, o£. cit.
,
218; Phillips, op. jnt.
,
297-298; Bromage, o£. cit.
,
281
.
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TABLE I
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION
SINCE 1940
Year Total No.
of Cities
Total No. of
Comm. Cities
Percent
1941 2,033 332 16.3
1945 2,033 327 16.1
1950 2,033 302 14.9
1955 2,527 356 14.
1
1960 2,562 309 12.0
1965 3,051 237 7.9
1968 2,985 190 6.4
SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers
Association, 1943-68).
There has been a steady decrease in the percentage of cities which have
the commission system of government. Between the years 1941-1968, the per-
centage decline was nearly 10 percent.
The main advantages of the commission system were considered to be
that government could be simple, for all power was concentrated in a few
hands; that with the short ballot voters elect only a few officials, which would
allow greater control by the citizen, more democracy, and permit the voters
to elect better qualified candidates which would result in better government; that
government could be run as a corporation for the commission resembled a
62
corporate business organization; that the elimination of separation of powers
and checks and balances would be conducive to the government responding
expeditiously to the people's demands for governmental service; that leading-
citizens would be willing to serve as commissioners, thus elevating the standard
for officeholders and providing bettern government; and that commissioners
would be elected on a non-partisan ballot. “ These professed advantages more
than anything else struck a death knell for political machines in municipal
politics, for ward elections and party labels would be abolished.
However, many of the features which were worshipped as the commission's
strong points turned out to be its most glaring weaknesses. The commission
government failed to provide a brake on government spending. The same
commissioners who appropriated money spent it as heads of departments.
Commissioners were often inadequately equipped as administrators. There was
no provision for an organizational distinction between the policy-making
function. There was no single person responsible for executive leadership. And
lastly, the commission plan was "so conducive to buck-passing that although the
voter needs to make only five choices at the polls, he (did) not know whom to
23
Adrian, o£. cit. ; Blair, o£. cit.; Munro, City Government by
Commission, _op. cit. ; Thomas Reed, Municipal Government in the United States
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934); Bromage, 0£. _cit.
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blame for bad government or to praise for good government. ”24
Nevertheless, the commission system was an astonishingly radical
departure
. from the prevailing forms of government at the turn of the century.
The main feature which distinguished it from traditional municipal politics was
the complete abandonment of separation of powers. But, as Adrian observed in
discussing the plan, "outmoded structures of government live beyond the time
when they are needed, as do all human institutions which suffer the rigidity of
being organized on a formal basis. There is no future for the commission
structure of government. Those commission cities that remain do so as a
result of apathy or because office-holders have a vested interest in the status
25
quo.
"
The council-manager form of government was devised to meet the
deficiencies of the commission system. Although, the commissioners could
very easily determine policy, they often lacked the competence to direct the
daily complex problems of administration. The council-manager plan was seen
not only as a replacement for the commission plan, but as a remedy for the
difficulties experienced by other forms of municipal government.
3
24
Forms of Municipal Government (New York: National Municipal League,
1939), 4.
"
^Adrian, _op. eft.
,
218.
2
^ Story of the Council-Manager Plan (New York: National Municipal
League, 1940), 12; Ibid. , Forms of Municipal Government (New York: National
Municipal League, 1959), 12.
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The exact origin of the council-manager system is a matter of some
dispute. Both Staunton, Virginia and Sumter, South Carolina claim to be the
first city to institute the council-manager form. In deciding on a new form of
government to replace its weak-mayor, bicameral council system, Staunton in
1908 chose the general manager type.
However, Richard S. Childs, who at that time was secretary of the
National Short Ballot Organization, was mainly responsible for the development
and popularizing of the council-manager plan. Childs blamed politicians and
the governmental structure for municipal corruption and he believed "that by
tinkering with the mechanics of government its control could be taken from the
27boss and the machine and returned to the people. " It has been said that the
"city manager plan was the result of the combination of two experiments, the
commission plan and the Staunton plan. Richard Childs was the minister who
28
performed the ceremony that united the two. "
This ceremony occurred in 1911 in Lockport, New York when Childs
drafted a city charter combining provisions for a city-manager with provisions
for a commission government. However, this model charter was rejected by the
27
John East Porter, Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought
of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1965), 21.
28
Stone, Price and Stone, op. cit. , 9.
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state legislature, but it "became the basic model for all future manager
29
charters." Therefore, Sumter, South Carolina is credited with putting into
effect the first genuine council-manager plan the following year. This new form
of government received its greatest impetus and greatest publicity in 1914
when Dayton, Ohio put it into operation. The council-manager system was
firmly endorsed by the National Municipal League and with this endorsement,
the national movement to gain acceptance for the plan was underway.
The use of the council-manager form of government by municipalities
increased progressively until today it is used by 43 percent of cities with over
5,000 population and in more than 50 percent of cities with populations
30
between 25,000 and 250,000.
The following two tables provide information on the growth of the
council-manager plan in all cities between 1915 and 1960 and the growth of the
plan in cities with over 5,000 population between 1941-1968.
99J
Reed, cit.
,
205.
^Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Manager's
Association, 1968), 54.
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TABLE II
GROWTH OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN31
YEAR NUMBER
1915 49
1920 158
1925 297
1930 388
1935 451
1940 506
1945 590
1950 900
1955 1, 170
1960 1,682
SOURCE: Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago:
International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).
13.
3l
Adrian, o£. cit. , 220; Story of the Council-Manager Plan , jop. cit..
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TABLE III
COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION
YEAR Total No. of
Cities
Total No. of
Council-Manager
Cities
Percent
1941 2,033 315 15.5
1945 2,033 350 17.3
1950 2,033 495 24.3
1955 2,527 764 30.3
1960 2,562 931 38.0
1965 3,051 1,202 40.0
1968 2,985 1,283 43.0
SOURCE: Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago:
International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).
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The two strongest advantages claimed for the council-manager form of
government were that: (1) there is complete concentration of administrative
authority and responsibility in the hands of the manager; and (2) there is a
separation of politics or legislation from administration for the legislative
function is exercised by the council and the administrative function is in the
hands of the manager. Other advantages claimed were (1) no separation of
powers or checks and balanced; (2) professionalization of administration; and
(3) a structure of government which can be easily understood by the people,
thereby facilitating accountability from elected representatives.
Harold Stone and similarly-minded colleagues have suggested that the
general purpose of the leading advocates of the council-manager plan was to
"have the city government devote its energies more effectively toward getting
work done for the community and toward wasting less of its money and effort on
32
incidental or factional purposes." To achieve this, the advocates proposed
33
three political ideas. First, the idea that the most capable and public spirited
citizens should serve on the governing body as representatives of the city at
large, to determine policies for the benefit of the community as a whole rather
than for a party, faction or neighborhood. This idea was embodied in the non-
32
Stone, et. al.
,
"The Theory of Government, " in Edward C. Banfield,
Urban Government (New York: Free Press, 1969), 322.
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partisan ballot and in the system of election at large of a small council. Second,
the idea that municipal administration should be delegated to a thoroughly
competent, trained executive, who should get and hold his job on his executive
ability alone. This idea was embodied in the concentration of administrative
authority in the city manager. Third, the idea that voters should hold only the
councilmen politically responsible and should give the city manager a status of
permanence and neutrality in political controversy. This idea was embodied in
the unification of powers in the council as a body comprising the only elected
officials in the city government.
Reformers have accorded the council-manager plan an inordinate amount
of praise, but the plan has also been subject to criticism. The critics argued
that various groups, e.g.
,
racial and geographical interests, ought to be
represented on the council since a small council consisting largely of renown
community leaders was unrepresentative, ergo undemocratic. Critics also
argued that the undemocratic nature of the plan was reflected in the fact that the
manager was non-elective, thus resulting in the manager being irresponsive to
the will of the public and hence beyond public control. The fact that the manager
was appointed by and was accountable to a body elected by the people, namely
the council, did not pacify the critics. Another objection to the council-manager
system was that there was no political leadership - a basic requirement in the
70
OA
policy formulation. It was. assumed that the mayor, usually a figurehead in
manager cities, would be the political leader while the manager concentrated
on administrative matters, but experience has proven otherwise. 35 There were
other objections to the council-manager system, but the undemocrat.ic and lack
of political leadership arguments were probably the two most common ones.
From the standpoint of honesty, impartiality, and efficiency, the council-
manager form of government seems to be a qualified success, save for a few
exceptions. ° However, advocates of the system erroneously assumed that
politics could be separated from administration. In reviewing what happened in
Dayton, Childs observed, "politics blew out of the window when Dayton's first
37
city manager blew in. " But, no clear and sharp distinction can be made
between politics and administration for one blends into the other. Furthermore,
if politics is the "allocation of scarce resources" and the manager administers
this allocation, he is ipso facto engaging in politics. Karl Bosworth stated that
34
On problems of political leadership in manager cities see Charles R.
Adrian, "Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities: A Study of Three
Communities," Public Administration Review
,
18 (Summer, 1958), 208-222.
35 Clyde Snider, American State and Local Government (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), 406-407.
36
Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics , o£. cit., 185.
37
Childs, Civic Victories
,
op . cit.
,
148.
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"council
-manager government, by placing the manager directly in public view,
accentuates public interest in how this kind of bureaucrat operates as a political
leader. " He went on to say that "where managers are used, let us think of
them as officers of general administrative direction and political leadership, for
that is what they are.
"The council-manager plan.
. . suffers from some weaknesses as do all
human institutions. It has, however so satisfied the bulk of voters in cities
using it that, once adopted abandonments are rare."
In summary there are three principal forms of municipal government
which exist in the United States at present; mayor-council, council-manager
and commission. Table IV gives the distribution of forms of government by
population categories.
Of the 2,985 cities reporting, 50.6 percent have mayor-council
government, 6.4 percent have commission government and 43.0 percent have
the council-manager form. Mayor-council governments are quite prevalent
in the large and small population categories, while council-manager governments
are popular in the middle-sized cities.
^ 8
"The Manager is a Politician," Public Administration Review, 18
(Summer, 1958), 216-222.
^Adrian, Governing Urban America , op . cit. , 228.
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Electoral Systems
Nonpartisanship
One significant political change accompanying the manager plan of
40government was nonpartisan elections. (As indicated in Chapter 2, non-
partisan elections refer to elections in which party labels are not printed on
the ballot.) Nonpartisan elections are used in 64.9 percent of the cities with
over 5,000 population. Where the nonpartisan ballot is used, it is most often
connected with commission or council-manager governments and with the at-
large system of representation. The nonpartisan ballot is found in 82.3 percent
of cities over 5,000 population with manager governments, 49.2 percent of
41
mayor-council cities and 69.5 percent of commission cities. Nonpartisan-
ship spread also to judicial offices and even to two state legislatures -
Minnesota and Nebraska. However, it is most widely used on the local level
for city elections.
40
The development of the nonpartisan ballot actually began before the
municipal reform movement. For a detailed history of this development see
Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of Califronia
Press, 1960).
4
Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers
Association, 1968).
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Tables V and VI provide an indication on the use of nonpartisanship in
certain population categories and by the various types of government.
The nonpartisan ballot was adopted by reformers as a means of
divorcing local politics from state and national issues. Reformers had argued
that city government was primarily a matter of efficiency and "good business"
and therefore had nothing in common with state and national politics. If local
government was a "business operation, " it followed that local officials should
be more businessmen than politicians. Therefore, nonpartisanship was an
effective means to recruit the "good people" of the city, i.e., those in the
upper and middle class, who would not ordinarily associate themselves with
local government because of partisan wranglings. 'It was. . . assumed that if
the boss were denied his chance to use the party ticket to elect his crew, then
the boss system would disappear. Thus it was proposed that city elections be
held without benefit of party labels so that honest citizens would have a chance
to win office without having to win the favor of the minions of the party
42
machine. " Childs observed that with nonpartisan elections combined with
the short ballot, the "voter can accumulate and carry in his head his brief list
of personal preferences and do without guidance of party names and symbols on
42
Lockard, ojd. ctt.
,
226-227.
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TABLE V
NONPARTISANSHIP IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION
Population Category No. of Cities
Reporting
Percent
Partisan
Percent
Nonpartisan
Over 500,000 24 41.7 58.3
250,000-500,000 25 24.0 76.0
100,000-250,000 90 41.
1
58.9
50,000-100,000 208 31.7 68.3
25,000- 50,000 427 33.3 66.7
10,000- 25,000 1,057 34.4 65.6
5,000- 10,000
All cities over
1,049 36. 9 63.
1
5,000 2,880 35.
1
64.9
SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City
Managers Association, 1S68).
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TABLE VI
NONPARTISANSHIP AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Form of Government No. of Cities
Reporting
Percent
Partisan
Percent
Nonpartisan
Mayor-Council 1,387 50.8; 49.2
Council-Manager 1,229 17.7 82.3
Commission 174 30.5 69.5
Town Meeting
Representative
62 43.5 56.5
Town Meeting 28 39.3 60.7
SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City
Managers Association, 1968).
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43
the ballot or voting machine. " ' Thus, the voter would be able to make a
rational, better-informed choice of candidates.
Empirical evidence has failed to support many of these assumptions
which endeared the reformers to nonpartisanship. Charles Adrian found that
where nonpartisanship existed, the following patterns of elections may be
44
found: "elections where the only candidates who normally have any chance of
being elected are those supported directly by a major political party organiza-
45
tion"; "elections where slates of candidates are supported by various groups,
46
including political party organization"; "elections where slates of candidates
are supported by various interest groups, but political party organizations have
47
little or no part in campaign, or are active only sporadically"; and "elections
National Municipal League
,
"500 Non-Political Elections, " (1948),
172.
44
"A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections, " Western Political Quarterly ,
12 (June, 1959), 449-458.
45
Voters in Boston, Chicago and Detroit are well aware of the candidates’
party. Therefore, candidates feel free to accept the support of their party.
46
For an account of this phenomenon see Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan
Election: A Political Illusion ? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1958).
4
17
See J. Lieper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Consider-
ations and "A Case Analysis, " American Journal of Sociology , 64 (1958), 282-
289; G. W. Pearson, "Prediction in a Nonpartisan Election, " Public Opinion
Quarterly
,
12 (Spring, 1948), 115; Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class
and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines,
"
American Political Science Review, LVI I (September, 1963), 584-592; and Lee,
op . cit .
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where neither political parties nor slates of candidates are important in
campaigns. " This latter situation results in what Eugene Lee calls "politics
of acquaintance. " Candidates will attempt to fashion an organization comprised
of friends, neighbors, relatives, business associates and professional
colleagues.
Although nonpartisanship has presumably weakened political parties,
it has created a situation in which special interest groups and other loyalties
influence local government. Gerald Pomper found in Newark that nonpartisan
48
elections changed the lines of electoral cleavage. Instead of cleavage being
based on party loyalties, ethnic affiliation of voters were most influential.
Pomper stated that "the goal of its advocates - to emancipate municipal
elections from 'tyranny of the national and state political parties' -has been
fulfilled. On the other hand, nonpartisanship has not succeeded in creating a
model electorate, one which makes its decision free of any group influences.
In fact the displacement of party ties may simply result in the substitution of
other influences. " Morlan bluntly stated that "nonpartisanship results in
government by pressure groups - labor unions, business associates, etc. -
4 8
Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections, "
Public Opinion Quarterly
,
30 (Spring, 1966), 79.
49
Ibid.
,
95.
79
50
rather than parties at the city level."
Advocates of nonpartisanship also naively assumed that with parties
divorced from local politics, local voting could be based upon local issues.
But, the fact is that discussion of local issues have been avoided in campaigns.
Instead, candidates have spoken only in vague generalities and the personalities
of candidates have become of great importance. Because candidates must
appeal to the whole electorate, they steer clear of controversial matters, ergo
important issues.
Some investigators doubt the separation of partisan politics from local
51
voting with the use of nonpartisan elections. Williams and Adrian, in their
study of nonpartisan elections in four Michigan cities, discovered that voters
who voted in local nonpartisan election for slates of candidates were also very
likely to vote for partisan candidates on the state level. They also found that
minority party candidates had a better chance of winning against the majority
party candidate in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections. Also, in
nonpartisan cities where Democrats predominate, persons who vote Republican
Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis, " National
Municipal Review (now National Civic Review ), (November, 1949), 485-490.
51
Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics
Under the Nonpartisan Ballot, " American Political Science Review , 53 (December
1959), 1052-63; Salisbury and Black, o£. cit. ; Charles E. Gilbert, "Some
Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities, u Midwest Journal of Politics ,
6 (1962), 345-62.
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regularly would gain an "increased voice in local affairs. " Gilbert's findings
support the latter point of view, at least in large cities. He similarly dis-
covered that nonpartisan elections favored the Republicans and the conservative
forces, as a whole, in city politics. Salisbury and Black concluded that
despite the nonpartisan format of local elections.
. .
and despite a relative
absence of overt electioneering by party organization or partisan identification
of candidates, cleavages are manifested in local campaigns which bear a close
52
resemblance to partisan cleavages in the community. "
It is highly doubtful that the aim of 'better' candidates have been
achieved. Exactly what is meant by 'better' has never been clarified. However,
if 'better' means more representative, clearly experience has not proven this
to be the case. If anything, the representative nature of local politics has been
narrowed under nonpartisanship.
In his study of nonpartisan elections, Adrian concluded that non-
5
partisanship has the following characteristics which he offered as propositions:
(1) it tends to weaken parties wherever it is in operation; (2) because voters
distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan participation, officeholders are
divided along these same lines and are required to separate their partisan and
52 .,
op . cit.
53
Charles Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan
Elections, " American Political Science Review , 46 (September, 1952), 766-76.
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nonpartisan activity; (3) nonpartisanship restricts the avenues for the recruit-
ment of candidates for partisan offices and nonpartisan offices alike; (4) funds
for financing nonpartisan and partisan campaigns are segregated; (5) methods
of fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are hampered; (6) it
encourages the avoidance of issues in campaigns; (7) it does not make allow-
ance for protest voting; (8) nonpartisanship benefits incumbents; and (9) there
is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body.
Although nonpartisanship may have contributed to the ngood government"
aim of municipal reformers and is highly regarded today by modern municipal
reformers, Nathan Mathews made an excellent point when he commented, "as
a city is a political institution, the people in the end will divide into parties; and
it would seem extremely doubtful whether the present system (partisanship)^
however illogical its foundation be, does not in fact produce better results, at
least in large cities, than if voters were divided into groups separated by
54
property, social or religious bounds."
Socio-Economic Characteristics and Their Relationship
To Governmental Form and Electoral System
The prestige of municipal government had plummeted to such low ebb in
the late 1800's that Lord Bryce unsympathetically characterized the cities as
54 Quoted in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics , 0£. cit. , 154.
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like the sick man who cannot find rest upon his own bed, but seeks to ease his
pain by moving from side to side. 1,55 Indeed, there was hardly one city in the
United States unscarred by the tentacles of corruption in the form of kickbacks,
extravagent spending and paid officeholders. The muckraker, Lincoln Steffens
could appropriately write the book, Shame of the Cities
,
and Lord Bryce
could also speak of the government in American cities as "the one conspicuous
failure of the United States. "
A half century later, a pessimistic Robert S. Allen stated it more
bluntly, although municipal government at mid-20th century was a somewhat
different apparatus. Allen wrote that local government "is a reeking shambles
58
of corruption, incompetence, waste and misrule. "
However, it cannot be stated unequivocally that municipal government
was a total failure, for the much needed goods and services and other functions
59
were provided by the urban political machines.’ But, in a number of ways
urban political machines only benefited the very rich and the very poor. The
55
James Bryce, American Commonwealth (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1891), 619-620.
56
Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Hill and Wang,
1904).
57
Bryce, op, cR.
,
608.
58
Robert S. Allen, Our Fair City , (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 3.
59 For a good discussion on this point see Robert Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. , 19o7), 71-81.
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middle -class, many of whom were businessmen and professionals were
excluded, although they were continuously confronted with increased taxation.
Therefore, much of the opposition to machines came from the middle-class.
In some cases, this group began to govern the cities and control the machines
60from the state house. But, in most instances, middle-class leaders initiated
local reform movements for the purpose of introducing a style of government
with emphasis on efficiency, honesty and economy.
The desire of the middle-class for "good government" did not entirely
emanate from what they felt were the evils of bossism and machines. They also
had a natural disdain towards the immigrants. Richard Hofstadter provided
the best analysis of the clash of these two cultures in the Age of Reform :
Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants
and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two
thoroughly different systems of political ethics. . .
One founded upon the indigenous Yankee-Protestant
political traditions, and upon Middle-class life,
assumed and demanded the constant disinterested
activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that
political life ought to be run, to a greater degree than
it was, in accordance with general principles and
abstract laws apart from and superior to personal
needs, and expressed a common feeling that govern-
ment should be in good part an effort to moralize the
lives of individuals while economic life should be
/? A
In Boston, after the Irish immigrants took control of City Hall, the
Yankees tried to govern Boston from the State House. For example, the
police commissioner was appointed by the governor until 1962 0
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intimately related to the stimulation and development
of individual character. The other system, founded
upon the European background of the immigrants, upon
their familiarity with independent political action,
their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and
upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their
migration, took for granted that political life of the
individual would arise out of family needs interpreted
political civic relations chiefly in terms of personal
obligations and placed strong personal loyalties above
allegiance to abstract codes of laws or morals.^
The middle-class style of politics which resulted from its particular
political ethos was basically different and incompatible from the immigrant's
style of politics. Therefore, reform politics - an outcome of the incompati-
bility between the two ethics - was spearheaded and supported by Anglo-Saxon
Protestant middle-class residents of the city.
6
1
(New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.
62
For a treatment of the political ethos theory see, Edward C. Banfield
and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); ibid.,
"Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, " American
Political Science Review , 58 (December, 1964), 884; and Raymond Wolfinger
and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government,
"
American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 006-^26.
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This clash of ethics was reflected in the different types of political
structures favored by the middle-class as compared to those favored by the
immigrants. Although, "it would be unwise to assert that there is a simple
casual relationship between public attitudes toward a particular governmental
feature and the likelihood that feature will be adopted,"63 it is safe to conclude
that there is a proclivity for the "middle-class ethos" to favor one type of
governmental form and the "immigrant ethos" another type. It is suggested
then that the middle-class conception of politics with its emphasis on honesty
and impartiality, implies an institituional arrangement of government of non-
64
partisanship, council-manager government and at large elections. The
immigrant's notion of politics, based on familial relationship, idea of neighbor-
hood, private interest to be fulfilled by seeking aid of politician, implies ward
elections, mayor-council government and partisanship.
63
Wolfinger and Field, o£. £it.
,
311.
64
I am assuming, as Banfield and Wilson did that the middle-class has
a public-regarding ethos i.e.
,
concern for the public or civic interest while the
immigrants have a private -regarding ethos, i.e., concern for private or
individual interest.
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Socio-Economic Characteristics and Local Government Structures
This historical review has suggested then that there is a tendency for
certain types of political structures to be located in a particular kind of socio-
economic environment.
But what political structures are likely to be located in a particular
kind of socio-economic environment?
Studies by John Kessel, Banfield and Wilson, Schnore and Alford, and
Alford and Scoble and Lineberry and Fowler and Liebman have all in some way
shown that council-manager governments were likely to be located in environ-
ments of low percentage non-white, high income, low proportion of foreign
born and persons over 65 years of age, high proportion of white collar workers,
high educational level, rapid growth and medium-size cities. Environments
where mayor-council governments were found manifested opposite character-
istics.
60
65
' John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment, "
American Political Science Review
,
56 (September, 1962), 616; Leo Schnore
and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics
of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly
,
(June, 1963), 1-17; Robert
Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of
American Cities, " Municipal Year Book (1965), 82-97; Banfield and Wilson,
op
.
cit
. ; Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fov/ler, "Reformism and Public
Policies in American Cities, " American Political Science Review
,
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(September, 1967), 701; Charles Liebman, "Functional Differentiation and
Political Characteristics of Suburbs, " American Journal of Sociology
,
66
(March, 1961), 485-491; Edgar Sherbenou, "Class Participation and the Council-
Manager Plan, " Public Administration Review (Summer, 1961), 131-135.
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Charles Liebman studied thirty-three cities and twenty-one suburbs
with over 10,000 population in the Chicago metropolitan area. Liebman wanted
to determine whether functional types of cities, e.g., manufacturing and
retail trade, vary with respect to manager or non-manager government and
partisan and nonpartisan elections. For example, do manufacturing cities have
manager governments and nonpartisan elections? He found that there was some
variance in functional types with respect to form of government and partisan
vote but it was statistically insignificant. Liebman was compelled to conclude
that at least some structural and institutional characteristics of governments
6 6
did not vary with respect to the city's function.
1
1
To phrase this another way,
the form of government and the type of elections did not correlate with the
variance in the functional types of cities.
John Kessel studied all cities in the United States between 25,000 and
250,000 population to discern if there was an affinity between the governmental
structure and the political environment. The three basic forms of municipal
government constituted the governmental structure and indicators of the
political environment were community size, city growth rate, percent of
foreign born and economic base. Kessel found that there is a correlation
between a particular environment, i.e.
,
certain types of cities are likely to
66
Ibid.
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have certain types of governmental forms. For example, mayor-council
governments piedominate in large and small cities, while manager government
is used largely by medium-size cities. Although, Kessel demonstrated a
connection between environment and governmental form, he was unable to
prove that connection necessarily follows. His inability to do such results
partially from the fact that there are many reasons why a particular environ-
ment adopts a particular form of government. Some of Kessel’s conclusions
are used as hypotheses in the present study.
In a study of three hundred suburbs in the twenty-five largest
"urbanized areas, " Leo Schnore and Robert Alford related governmental form
to social structure, i.e.
,
various social and economic characteristics. The
thesis under investigation was that socio-economic factors of a city may partially
explain its political structure. They wanted to "determine whether suburbs
possessing different forms of government display measurable differences in
6 7
socio-economic characteristics. This is the reverse of the question asked
by Liebman, i.e.
,
do different functional types of cities differ with respect to
form of government? A list of some eighteen socio-economic characteristics
was compiled for each suburb. Schnore and Alford did find some correlations
between form of government and social structure, e.g.
,
mayor-council
67
op
.
cit .
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government is likely to be found in a high non-white, high ethnic and low
educated area. Furthermore, they conclusively stated that the council-manager
environment "does tend to be the natural habitat of the upper middle-class."68
But exhibiting some degree of uncertainty, Schnore and Alford also stated that
they could not "explain the differences in political structures in terms of the
69
above compositional characteristics per se. " In other words, the causal
connections are blurred. But their findings do suggest that form of government
and socio-economic characteristics possibly would make a difference in
certain areas of local decision-making, e.g.
,
annexation decisions.
Robert Alford and Harry Scoble extended the findings of previous
studies - Kessel, Liebman and Schnore and Alford - which indicated a relation-
ship between the form of government and socio-economic characteristics to all
cities over 25,000 population. They attempted to empirically answer (rather
than assume the answer) why should political and socio-economic characteristics
of a city be related to its form of government? The three major social variables
which they used were: social heterogeneity (religion, race and ethnicity);
class composition (proportion of persons in white collar occupations or with
college education); and population growth and mobility. They found that almost
68
o£„ cit.
,
15.
69
op
.
Clt .
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all of these variables were associated with form of government. In reaching
a possible causal connection, Alford and Scoble concluded that mobility
seemingly explains the association of economic and class composition with
form. Therefore, they saw mobility of the population - with qualifications -
as a significant variable in explaining the interrelationship of socio-economic
factors and form of government.
Lineberry and Fowler, in their study of reformed and unreformed
institutions, derived conclusions which were at variance with those of Schnore
and Alford. Although they acknowledged the fact that "varying samples may
70
produce varying conclusion, " they concluded that their data did not
corroborate the fact that 'reformed’ cities (i.e., council-manager) are the
'natural habitate of the upper middle-class." Furthermore, they concluded the
"cities with reformed and unreformed institutions are not markedly different
in terms of demographic variables. Indeed some variables, like income, run
counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the
71
middle -clas s. " But, the study by Sherbenou supported the notion that
council-manager governments were located where persons of middle-class
status resided. He ranked seventy-four suburbs in the Chicago metropolitan
70
op. cit.
,
706.
71
op. cit
.
,
7 15.
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area according to median value of homes and found that in 18 of the twenty
cities with highest home values, council-manager government was prevalent
and was not prevalent in any of the 31 cities with the lowest home values.
Banfield and Wilson concluded that ethnicity was the most important
independent variable in explaining the differences in local political structures.
Manager governments were located where there was a high Anglo-Saxon
population while mayor-council governments were found in cities with high
percentage of immigrants in the population.
Summary
The reform movement spawned the alteration or modification of political
structures and electoral systems in innumerable cities. Most frequently
council-manager governments were substituted for mayor-council governments
while nonpartisan electoral systems replaced partisan electoral systems.
Although the number of cities which adopted the manager system did not surpass
those using the mayor=council system, 43% of cities with over 5,000 population
presently operate under the manager system. The institution of the nonpartisan
electoral system met with greater success than did the manager form of
government. In cities with over 5,000 population, 64.9% utilize nonpartisan
elections.
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As the reform movement was basically a movement by the middle-class
for power redistribution and the establishment of those principles and
mechanisms of government which they thought would assure ,Tbetter, more
efficient government, " the adoption of manager form of government and the
nonpartisan electoral system occurred in environments characterized as
middle-class. Several studies concluded that political structures and electoral
systems were related to the socio-economic environment. These studies found
that cities with high percentages of high income persons, high white collar
population, high population growth, low immigrant population, high mobility,
high home-ownership and high percentage of college educated persons, were
likely to have the manager form of government and nonpartisan electoral system.
In other words, there was a high positive correlation between cities with middle-
class social indicators and manager governments and nonpartisan elections.
Through the use of new and different empirical data, the following
chapter will re-examine some of the conclusions arrived at by the studies
cited in this chapter. The attempt will be to further elucidate the apparent
relationship between the socio-economic environment and the political structure.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
At this point, it is appropriate to re-emphasize one of the major theses
of this study cited in Chapter II, that there is a relationship between form of
government and socio-economic characteristics. It will be recalled that this
thesis in turn resulted in three subsidiary hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS I
.
Manager governments are likely to
manifest a more rapid population growth and rate
of mobility than mayor-council governments.
HYPOTHESIS II . Manager government more than
mayor-council governments are likely to have a
higher percentage of college educated persons; a
higher percentage of white collar workers; a lower
percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less; a
higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or
more and a higher percentage of homeowners.
HYPOTHESIS III . Mayor-council governments are
likely to be located in communities with higher non-
white and a higher ethnic population than manager
governments.
As also indicated in Chapter II, the forms of government were the
mayor-council and council-manager, with the commission form being eliminated
because of too few in the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The socio-
economic characteristics were defined as: (1) population growth and mobility;
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(^) social class; and (3) population homogeneity.
Because forms of government are not equally distributed regionally,
region was used as an intervening variable in examining the hypothesized
relationships. For example, the Far West has more manager cities while the
Northeast has more mayor-council cities. Therefore, some associations of
socio-economic variables with form of government may be due to regional
variation. Table VII provides the regional distribution of cities in the sample.
TABLE VII
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF GOVERNMENT
Type Northeast North Central South Far West
Mayor-Council 105 94 33 14
Manager 19 41 116 136
The Relationship Between Population Growth, Mobility and Form of Government -
Hypothesis I
Findings of the relationship between form of government and population
growth and mobility are presented in Table VIII.
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TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM
OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
% Population change 1950-1960 5.
1
8. 1
Mobility 46.3 46.7
N = 246 312
The table shows that rapidly growing communities are likely to have
manager governments. Although the trend is not dramatic, the difference in
the means is statistically significant at the .01 level. Table VIII also suggests
that there is no significant difference between mobility in mayor-council and
manager cities.
However, the findings in Table VIII may be due to the fact that the
effect of region was not considered. For example, growth may be greater in
manager cities because manager cities are located primarily in the Far West
and the Far West has a greater growth than any other region. And the
apparent absence of a relationship between mobility and manager government
likewise may be due to the factor of region. Table IX begins to provide
insight into these queries by relating growth and mobility with region.
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TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY
REGION
Characteristics No rtheast North Central South Far West
% Population change
1950-1960 2.2 8.5 6.8 9.1
Mobility 23.9 22.5 11.8 23.8
N = 124 136 149 149
F = .01 level of significance
The table reveals a statistically significant difference in the means between
regions for both variables. Thus, growth is greatest in the Far West, the
region with the most manager cities and least in the Northeast, the region
with the most mayor-council cities, with a 6. 9% difference between the mean
population growth in the Far West and that in the Northeast. In other words,
population increased over four times greater in the Far West than it did in the
Northeast. Mobility, as shown in Table IX, is distributed about equally, with
the exception of the South which had the lowest rate of mobility.
Consequently, the introduction of region as an intervening vaiiable in
Table IX begins to suggest a more precise association between population
growth, mobility and form of government. Since region suggests this
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additional perspective, the association of population growth and mobility with
form of government was examined within region in Table X.
Table X shows that when the association between growth and form of
government is analyzed within region, the apparent relationship of growth with
manager cities disappears in the Northeast; is weak but noticeable in the North
Central area; and is attained more clearly in the South and Far West - regions
which have more manager cities.
TABLE X
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION
AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Northeast North Central South Far West
M. C. Man. M. C. Man. M. C. Man. M. C. Man
.
% Population change
1950-1960 2.2 1.8 9.0 10.6 3.1 7.9 5.8 8.5
Mobility 23. 1 28.4 20.0 34.9 12.8 11.4 16.6 22.4
N = 105 19 94 41 33 116 14 136
F = .01 level of significance
Based on the evidence in Table X, the salient conclusion is that when
rapid growth takes place in the Far West, South, or North Central, it is more
likely to occur in manager cities than mayor-council cities.
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In regard to mobility, Table X suggests that the population in manager
cities in the Northeast, North Central and Far West are more mobile than the
population in mayor-council and manager cities in the South. In addition,
population in manager cities in the Northeast, North Central, and Far West are
more mobile than the population in mayor—council cities of those regions. No
significant difference in mobility prevails in the South between the two forms
of government.
The data from Table X, therefore confirms the hypothesis that when
region is included as an intervening variable, population growth jls_ greater in
manager cities than mayor-council cities with the acknowledgment that the
association is non-existent in the Northeast. Mobility is likewise associated
with the manager form of government, when region is included as an inter-
vening variable, in every area except the South.
Implicit in these findings is that region is an important intervening
variable in any attempts to explain the relationship of population growth and
mobility to form of government.
The Relationship Between Social Class and Form of Government - Hypothesis II
Table XI presents the analysis of the relationship between the various
social class variables with form of government, without considering region as
an intervening variable. The findings offer inconclusive support to the
hypothesis.
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Thus, Table XI suggests that manager government when compared to
mayor-council government does have a higher percentage of population with
four years of college or more and does have a somewhat higher percentage of
white collar workers. But the difference in the percentage of the population
earning $3, 000 or less is inconsequential, while the mayor-council cities have
higher percentages of the population earning $10,000 or more and owning homes.
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Social Class Variables Mayor-Council Manager
% Pop. 4 yrs. of college or more* 17. 7 30.9
% Pop. white collar workers / 46.0 48.3
% Pop. earning $3,000 or less/ 46.7 46.3
% Pop. earnings $10,000 or more* 47.2 43.2
% Pop. homeowners 69.0 66.7
N = 246 312
*F = .01 level of significance
/ F = .05 level of significance
As in the case of Hypothesis I, additional sophistication was sought in
the analysis by introducing the effects of region. Table XII suggests the
variance according to region for each of the social class variables without
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considering form of government.
The table suggests that the North Central region and higher percentage
of population with 4 years of college or more and that the Northeast had the
highest percentage of white collar workers, the highest percentage of the
population with income under $3,000 and over $10,000 and the highest per-
centage of homeowners.
TABLE XII
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY REGION
Social Class Cariables Northeast North Central South Far West
% Pop. 4 yrs. college or more* 11.9 16.4 12.4 11.6
% Pop. white collar workers* 49.5 48.8 43.
1
48.3
% Pop. earnings $3,000 or less* 22.7 16.7 7.0 16.9
% Pop. earnings $10,000 or more / 1.3 1.0 1. .8
% Homeowners 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.4
N = 124 136 149
*F = .01 level of significance
/F = . 05 level of significance
The South had the lowest percentage of persons employed in white collar
occupations and also the lowest percentage of persons earning $10,000 or
101
more. The difference in the percentage of homeowners seemed negligible.
The basic issue in terms of this hypothesis, however, is what effect
does region have upon the hypothesized relationship between social class and
form of government. Table XIII is an attempt to analyze this relationship
within region.
Table XIII consequently suggests that in every region more persons with
four years of college or more and more white collar workers are likely to be
located in manager cities. Therefore, the relationship of these two social
class variables to manager cities as revealed in Table XI remains when the
association is analyzed within regions.
Table XIII also suggests that manager cities in the Northeast and
North Central are likely to be inhabited by a greater percentage of persons
earning $3,000 or under while in the South and Far West more persons earning
$3,000 or under are located in mayor-council cities than manager cities.
The likelihood that more persons earning $10, 000 or over would be
located in mayor-council cities, as suggested in Table XI, disappears once
this apparent relationship is analyzed within regions. Although the difference
is not great, persons earning $10,000 or more are more likely to be found
in manager cities.
TABLE
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Analyzing thG relationship of homeowners to form of government reveals
that a greater percentage of homeowners are more likely to be found in manager
cities in the South and Far West with no discernible difference in the North
Central cities between manager and mayor-council cities. The Northeast had
more homeowners in mayor-council cities than manager cities.
Therefore, Table XIII presents the following evidence for Hypothesis
II: a higher percentage of college educated persons and white collar workers
are, as hypothesized, found in manager cities; that income under $3,000
relates to region rather than form of government; that manager cities do have
a higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or more in each region; and
that homeownership is related more to region than form of government.
Population Homogeneity and Form of Government - Hypothesis III
Table XIV, present the relationship between population homogeneity and
form of government without considering region. Although the difference is
not great, Table XIV reveals a greater percentage of non-white population in
mayor-council cities. Only a slight difference is indicated between the per-
centage of ethnicity of mayor-council cities and that of manager cities.
But again, region is of importance in clearly showing the relationship
between population homogeneity and form of government. Population homo-
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TABLE XIV
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
% Non -whites 46.0 43.3
% Ethnicity 44. 8 44.
1
N = 246 312
geneity, like forms of government, is unequally distributed in the United
States. Table XV presents the relationship of population homogeneity and
region without considering form of government.
Table XV indicates that the Northeast has both a greater percentage of
non-white population and a greater percentage of ethnicity than the North
Central, South or Far West. The difference in the percentage of non-white
population in the Northeast and the South however, is slight. The lowest per-
centage of non-white population is located in the North Central. Excluding the
Northeast, the percentage of ethnicity in the North Central, South and Far
West is about even.
But additional questions were raised by the findings in Tables XIV
and XV. For example, what effect does region have upon the relationship
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TABLE XV
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION
Characteristics Northeast North Central South Far West
% Non -white 47.7 39.3 46.5 44.7
% Ethnicity 48.3 42.8 43.5 43.5
N = 124 136 149 149
between the percent of non-white population and mayor-council cities ? Does
region significantly affect the association between the percentage of ethnicity
and mayor-council cities ? Do mayor-council cities in the Northeast have a
greater percentage of non-white population and a greater percentage of
ethnicity than mayor-council cities in the South, North Central or Far West ?
Table XVI provides answers to these queries. Table XVI presents the analysis
of the relationship between population homogeneity and form of government
within region.
Table XVI reveals that the association of a greater percentage of non-
white population with mayor-council cities disappears in the Northeast and
South. Only in the North Central and Far West is there a higher percentage
of non-white population in mayor-council cities than manager cities.
Thus,
region is of extreme importance in assessing the relationship
between non-
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white population and mayor-council cities.
TABLE XVI
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION AND FORM
OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Northeast North Central South Far West
M.C. Man. M.C. Man. M. C. Man. M. C. Man.
% Non -white 47.6 48.
1
45.9 41.7 42.3 47.6 44.7 39.3
% Ethnicity 47.3 54.5 44.5 41.8 39.4 44.7 41.2 42.8
N = 105 19 94 41 33 116 14 136
Furthermore, Table XVI suggests that only in the North Central is
there a higher percentage of ethnicity in mayor-council cities than manager
cities, while in the Northeast, South and Far West manager cities show a
greater percentage of ethnicity than mayor-council cities. Therefore, the
association of greater percentages of non-white population and ethnicity with
mayor-council cities, as revealed in Table XIV, continued to exist only in
the North Central when the relationship was analyzed within region.
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Summary
The findings presented in this chapter are supportive in some instances
of the three hypotheses under investigation. However, it was also discovered
that in other instances, the data did not provide support for the hypotheses. It
may be recalled that the three hypotheses were (1) that manager governments
are likely to be located in cities with high population growth and high mobility;
(2) that manager governments are likely to have higher percentages of college
educated persons, white collar workers, and homeowners, persons earning
$10,000 or more and a lower percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less
than mayor-council governments; (3) that mayor-council governments are
likely to be located in communities with higher percentage of non-white and
ethnic populations than manager governments.
Without considering the effects of region part of Hypothesis I was
confirmed - that manager governments were likely to be in rapidly growing
communities. However, the difference in the rate of mobility between manager
communities and mayor-council was negligible. Also, not considering region
as a possible intervening variable, the findings on social class variables
(Hypothesis II) were basically consistent with those of Lineberry and Fowler
that manager cities have "slightly more educated population and slightly
higher white collar population, " while mayor-council cities have higher
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incomes. Manager governments, as hypothesized, had a lower percentage of
persons earning $3,000 or less although not great, but more homeowners were
not likely to be located in manager cities as hypothesized. But, essentially,
there was no distinctive difference in demographic composition between manager
cities and mayor-council cities. Again, excluding a consideration of region,
Hypothesis III was confirmed on both counts, i.e.
,
that mayor-council
governments had greater non-white and ethnic populations than manager govern-
ments. This finding is similar to those of previous studies.
Based upon additional findings and analysis it is concluded that region
is a significant intervening variable in explaining the relationship between
socio-economic environment and political structures. Wolfinger and Field
findings were smilar in regard to region being an important factor in explaining
the structure of local government. *
When the influence of region was considered, some other interesting
findings emerged. Manager governments with region controlled continued to
be located in rapidly growing communities, except the Northeast, thus further
corroborating Hypothesis I and the previous fundings of Kessel, Schnore and
"''Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the
Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review , 60
(June, 1966), 306-326.
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Alford, Alford and Scoblo, and Linoberry find Fowler. Mobility emerged as
being related to manager governments, support for Hypothesis I, in all regions
except the South. Also in regard to mobility, the findings were similar to
Alford and Scoble that "eastern cities with high mobility are likely to have
3
manager governments. " But where they found that "mobility remains important
even within regions, the findings from this analysis lead to the conclusion that
mobility is important only within regions, otherwise no association between
mobility and manager government is demonstrated.
More support was provided for the Hypothesis II that manager cities
are likely to be inhabited by the middle-class when the association was examined
/
within regions. But, it cannot be concluded as Schnore and Alford did that
4
manager cities are the "natural habitat of the upper middle -class. " Manager
governments are likely to have high educated, white collar and income
populations and more homeowners only in the South and Far West.
o
John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A
Statistical Note about American Cities, " American Political Science Review ,
56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of
Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs, " Administrative
Science Quarterly
,
8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
"Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities, " Municipal Year Book ,
(Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Lineberry and
Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities, " American
Political Science Review
,
61 (September, 1967), 706.
°Alford and Scoble, ibid
,
89 .
Schnore and Alford, o£. ait., 15.
no
When mayor-council government was viewed from within region, it was
found that the association of mayor-council cities with non-white population
held only in the North Central and Far West. John Kessel had found that "when
region is controlled, there is no relation between form and non-whites
5
composition. " Ethnicity is likely to be associated with mayor-council cities
only in the North Central.
In the following Chapter, the effects that social indicators and political
structure variables have upon voter turnout rate shall be examined.
5Kessel, op . cit.
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CHAPTER V
VOTER TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
The preceding chapter was an attempt to demonstrate the relationship
between various socio-economic characteristics and the political structure. The
present chapter is an effort to relate form of government, type of electoral
system, and socio-economic characteristics to voter turnout at the local level.
The working hypothesis is that these variables are determining factors in
municipal election turnout. Thus, voter turnout is the dependent variable,
while the independent variables are form of government, type of electoral system,
and the socio-economic indices.
As indicated in Chapter II, voter turnout is measured by the election
turnout figures for two mayoralty or councilmanic elections in each city in this
study from 1961 through 1968. Form of government constitutes the mayor-
council and manager forms of local government, while the electoral system
refers to partisan and nonpartisan elections. The socio-economic indices are
once more divided into three classifications: (1) population growth and
mobility; (2) social class; and (3) population homogeneity. Again, region is
utilized as an intervening variable.
For purposes of comparability, those cities on which complete data
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could not be obtained were eliminated from the analysis. Complete data
constituted having information on voter turnout, type of government, type of
electoral system, and the socio-economic characteristics. Thus, the original
list of 558 cities was reduced to 551.
Determinants of Voter Turnout
Form of Government
Political structures can inhibit or promote voter turnout. The role
assumed by each structure depends on the particular type of structure. It is
assumed that the mayor-council form of government provides easy accessibility
for the expression of group and individual interests. Furthermore, it allows
widespread group representation and it caters to the demands of various
elements of the population. It is assumed that manager government limits
representation and that in the manager environment there is general and basic
agreement on the fundamental issues and principles of society.
HYPOTHESIS I . Therefore, it is hypothesized that the
mayor-council form of government is more likely to
encourage and witness greater voter participation and
turnout than manager governments.
^
1
Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities,"
American Political Science Review , 62 (September, 1968), 796. Lee and Alford
found that mayor-council partisan governments were likely to have greater
turnout than other forms.
In a study of city elections in Kansas, Clarence J. Hein found the voter
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Electoral System
Partisan elections give vent to the various and sundry cleavages which
exist in the political system. However, partisan elections may also create
cleavages. Partisan elections permit parties to serve as generators of
issues, mobilizers of the electorate, and stimulators of interests.
HYPOTHESIS II . Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections
exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus,
nonpartisanship has the effect of diminishing voter
turnout.
^
HYPOTHESIS III
. It is additionally hypothesized that where
partisan elections are combined with the mayor-council form
of government, voter turnout is likely to be greater than
where other combinations of electoral systems and forms
of government exist. ^
participation varied with the particular system of government. However,
commission cities had the highest turnout, while manager cities had the next
highest and mayor-council cities the lowest. See his Voter Participation in City
Elections with Populations Between 5,000 and 50,000 in Kansas
,
(Lawrence,
Kansas: Governmental Research Bureau, University of Kansas, 1958). Lee's
and Alford's data led them to conclude that form of government was more strongly
related to turnout than form of election and that turnout was greater in non-
manager cities (mayor-council) than in manager cities. Op. cit.
,
804. This
study challenges Hein's findings and tests Lee's and Alford's conclusions.
o
Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1960); Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1969), 224.
O
Lee and Alford, jjp. cit.
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Socio-Economic Characteristics
Population Growth and Mobility
. The longer a person lives in a
community, the more likely that he will become integrated into the community
structure; thus, the more he will participate in the affairs of the community.
4
Persons are also confronted with the task of fulfilling a residency requirement.
Ruth Dixon stated that "the high level of mobility in the American population
makes residence requirements especially significant as factors barring persons
from voting. "
HYPOTHESIS IV
.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that cities
with rapid population growth and high mobility will experience
low voter turnout.
Social Class. "The more educated person is more aware of the impact
of government on the individual than is the person of less education.
4
Ibid
. ;
Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959);
Lester Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1965); Ruth B. Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections" (unpublished
Master’s thesis, University of California, 1966); and Harry Sharp’s study of
Detroit indicated that migration leads to low voter turnout, "Migration and
Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Community, " Public Opinion Quarterly
,
19,
(1955), 206-209.
5
Dixon, ’"Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections. " 0£. cit. 6.
0
Milbraith, Political Participation
,
op . cit.
,
121-122.
HYPOTHESIS V
. Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of
well-educated (college) persons in the population increases.
White collar employed persons, homeowners, and high income persons
presumably have a stake in the community and are highly interested in what is
happening. Consequently, they are more likely to turn out to vote.
HYPOTHESIS VI
.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout should be higher in those cities with a higher per-
centage of white collar employees, homeowners, and a
higher percentage of high income persons than in cities
with high percentages of opposite characteristics.
Population Homogeneity
.
Blacks, who constitute the largest percentage
of the non-white category, are concentrated at the bottom end of the socio-
economic ladder. Persons of low socio-economic rank tend to vote less than
others, and it can be expected that those in the non-white group are prone to
remain away from the polls.
HYPOTHESIS VII . Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high percentage
of non-white population.
The persistence of ethnic voting has been examined by a number of
7 . .
researchers, among them Parenti, Wolfinger and Gabriel. A prerequisite
to high ethnic voting is ethnic salience.
7
Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic
Identification," American Political Science Review , 61 (September, 1967), 717;
Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting,
American Political Science Review , 59 (December, 1965), 896-908; and Richard
A. Gabriel, "Ethnic Attitudes and Political Behavior in City and Suburb" (un-
published Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1969).
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HYPOTHESIS VIII. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
cities with high ethnic populations (i.e.
,
foreign-born
and population of native-mixed parentage) will experience
low voter turnout.
Findings
The first part of the analysis will be that of the relationship between
form of government, electoral systems, and voter turnout, i.e., Hypothesis I
through Hypothesis III. This is presented in Tables XVII through XXIII. The
second part of the analysis will present the data on the relationship between
socio-economic indices and voter turnout, i.e.
,
Hypothesis IV through
Hypothesis VIII. This is demonstrated in Tables XXIV through XXXV.
Finally, and more importantly, the effect of form of government electoral
systems, and the socio-economic indices will be analyzed as they collectively
affect voting turnout. Table XXXVI deals with this analysis.
Form of Government, Electoral System, and Voter Turnout - Part I
Form of Government . Table XVII presents the relationship between
voter turnout and form of government. The findings seem to corroborate
Hypothesis I, i.e.
,
that turnout is likely to be greater in mayor-council cities
than in manager cities. Turnout in manager cities was less than half of that in
mayor-council cities.
117
TABLE XVII
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
N = 246 312
Voter Turnout 38% 16%
Table XVIII shows the findings of turnout regionally. Cities in the
Far West and South had a far lower turnout than cities in the other regions. It
can, therefore, be asked which factors were associated with the South and Far
West which resulted in a lower number of people turning out to vote in local
elections? Why did more people vote in the Northeast and North Central
areas? Also, the Far West and South had a greater percentage of manager
cities than the other regions. Table XVII showed that manager cities had a
lower turnout than mayor-council cities. Was the low turnout in the Far West
and the South and in manager cities an expression of the same phenomenon? That
is, was turnout lower in the Far West and South because they had more manager
cities than the other regions? Or was turnout lower in manager cities because
they happened to be located to a greater extent in the Far West and South?
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TABLE XVIII
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION
Characteristics Northeast North Central South Far West
N = 124 131 146 150
Voter Turnout 37% 39% 17% 11%
Table XIX attempts to answer these questions by controlling for region and
subsequently relating turnout to form of government.
TABLE XIX
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Northeast North Central South Far West
M.C. Man. M.C. Man. M. C. Man M.C. Man.
N = 105 19 94 41 33 116 14 136
Voter Turnout 41% 42% 44% 34% 19% 12% 12% 10%
Although low turnout continued to be associated with the South and Far
West, it was again substantiated that fewer people vote in local elections held
in manager cities with one exception, the Northeast. However, when the effect
119
of region was considered, the difference in turnout in mayor-council cities
and manage 1 cities was not nearly as great as the difference when there was a
lack of regional consideration as indicated in Table XVII. The only region which
continued to manifest any significant degree of difference was the North Central
area, which showed a ten percent difference in turnout in mayor -council and
manager cities. Nevertheless, although the findings were not dramatic when
the influence of region was accounted for, they do support the first hypothesis
that turnout is likely to be higher in mayor-council cities than in manager
cities.
Electoral System . Hypothesis II suggested that the type of electoral
system affects turnout. What effect does the difference in electoral systems
have upon turnout in each region? This hypothesis and question will be
investigated in the following two tables.
Table XX shows the overall relationship between voter turnout and the
electoral system.
TABLE XX
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Partisan Nonpartisan
N = 181 370
Voter Turnout 34% 25%
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Cities with partisan elections experienced a greater turnout than
those with nonpartisan elections, as was suggested in Hypothesis II.
But what effect does region have upon the association between electoral
systems and voter turnout? Table XXI presents the relationship between voter
turnout and electoral systems by region.
The findings presented in this table cannot be considered as conclusive,
but merely suggestive, for there were only sixteen nonpartisan cities in the
Northeast, no partisan elections in the Far West, and the North Central area
had almost an even division between nonpartisan and partisan election turnout
in the one region where partisan and non-partisan cities were almost equal in
number.
TABLE XXI
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Northeast North Central South Far West
P NP P NP P NP P NP
N = 108 16 67 64 6 140 0 150
Voter Turnout 42% 33% 40% 42% 20% 13% * 10%
*Many Far West cities, motivated by the progressive movement around
the turn of the century abandoned partisan elections. See Lee, Politics of
Nonpartisanship
,
op
.
cit.
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Nevertheless, when region was controlled, the hypothesized relation-
ship between partisan elections exist in the Northeast and the South (even
though the South had more nonpartisan elections than partisan). In addition in
the Far West, where there are no partisan elections, voter turnout was (10
percent) smaller than in any other region, regardless of form of election. Thus,
partisanship does heighten turnout, as was suggested in Hypothesis II.
Form of Government, Electoral System and Voter Turnout
. Hypothesis
III suggested that turnout would be greater in mayor-council partisan cities
than in cities with other forms. But was turnout greater? Does region affect
the hypothesized relationship, e.g.
,
was turnout greater in mayor-council
partisan cities in the Northeast than in manager nonpartisan cities in the Far
West and South. Tables XXII and XXIII provide partial answers. Table XXII
shows the turnout rate by both form of governments and electoral systems
without considering region.
TABLE XXII
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Mayor-Council Manager
Partisan 41% (146) 38% (35)
Nonpartisan 32% (94) 13% (276)
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The data in Table XXII apparently substantiates Hypothesis III, that
mayor-council partisan cities are likely to have a greater turnout than cities
with other political and electoral forms, i.e.
,
mayor-council nonpartisan,
manager partisan, and manager nonpartisan, although manager partisan cities
did have a turnout rate nearly as high as that of mayor-council partisan cities.
Also, indicated in Table XXII is the fact that voter turnout is higher in mayor
cities, partisan or nonpartisan than in manager cities, partisan or nonpartisan,
respectively. Furthermore, the data demonstrated another interesting fact,
i.e.
,
that regardless of electoral form, mayor-council cities still tend to have
a higher turnout than manager cities, thus further substantiating Hypothesis I.
Do these findings stand when this relationship is examined within
region? Table XXIII, hopefully, provides the answer to this question. This
table shows the voter turnout rate for form of government and electoral system
by region.
Support for Hypothesis III, that mayor-council partisan cities tend
to have greater turnout than cities with other political and electoral forms,
diminished when the influences of region were considered. In the Northeast,
manager partisan cities had a higher turnout, although by only 2 percent, than
mayor-council partisan cities. Turnout in partisan elections, however, remained
higher than that in nonpartisan elections whether they were held in mayor-
council or manager cities, except in one instance - the North Central. This
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TABLE XXIII
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Mayor-Council Manager
Northeast
Partisan 43% (91) 44% (17)
Nonpartisan 34% (14) T
North Central
Partisan 41% (51) 35% (16)
Nonpartisan 48% (39) 33% (25)
South
'Partisan - -
Nonpartisan 19% (27) 12% (113)
Far West
Partisan * _ *
Nonpartisan 12% (14) 10% (136)
*No Partisan elections
' Insufficient sample
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provides further corroboration for Hypothesis II.
The data in Table XXIII further indicated that mayor-council nonpartisan
cities in the North Central has a greater turnout than cities with other types.
Higher turnout in manager partisan cities than in manager nonpartisan cities
did not wash out when the effects of region were accounted for.
A significant finding which consistently appeared was that mayor-
council cities attract a larger turnout than manager cities except in the instance
of partisan mayor-council cities in the Northeast, regardless of whether
elections were partisan or nonpartisan. Therefore, this fact apparently
provides further confirmation of Hypothesis I.
Socio-Economic Indices and Voter Turnout - Part II
Population Growth and Mobility . Hypothesis IV indicated that cities
with rapidly growing populations and high mobility were likely to experience low
voter turnout. But was this hypothesis substantiated by the data, and how did
form of government, electoral system and region affect the hypothesized
relationship? The following four tables investigate this proposition. Table XXIV
provides the correlation coefficients of population growth and mobility with
voter turnout.
Part of Hypothesis IV is corroborated by the data in Table XXIV, i.e.
,
that cities with growing or expanding populations are likely to have a low turn-
out in elections. Whether or not this negative influence of growth on turnout
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TABLE XXIV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY
Characteristics All Cities N = 551
% Population change 1950-1960* -. 13
% Migrants from different county .04
Refers to population increase
The standard of measure used herein is the Pearson product-moment
coefficient (-). The size of the product-moment coefficient (r) varies from +1
through 0 to -1. It provides two things: (1) the magnitude of the relationship
and (2) the direction of the relationship. For the purpose of this study the
coefficients may be interpreted as follows: 0-3 = poor; 4-6 = average; 7-9 =
very good; 1.0= excellent. The coefficients are product-moment correlations
of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.
disappears when form of government is considered will be analyzed below. The
aspect of Hypothesis IV dealing with mobility is not substantiated by the data,
i.e.
,
that cities with high mobility were likely to experience low voter turnout.
Surprisingly, mobility was positively related to turnout, although not significantly.
In Table XXV population growth and mobility will be analyzed with turnout by
form of government to ascertain the effect of the latter.
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TABLE XXV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
N = 240 N = 311
% Population change 1950-60 -.08 -.07
% Migrants from different county .04 .06
The coefficients in this Table are product -moment correlations of the
actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.
A significant association of population growth and mobility with either
form of government was not demonstrated. However, cities, whether they had
mayor-council or manager governments, which experienced a substantial growth
in population were likely to have low turnout at the polls. The finding, although
not significant, did provide support for the population growth aspect of
Hypothesis IV. Also, as shown in Table XXV, the negative effect that population
growth had upon turnout was slightly less in manager cities than in mayor-council
cities.
The positive association of mobility with turnout suggested in Table
XXIV, again appeared when form of government was considered. Furthermore,
mobility was positively correlated with turnout in both manager and mayoi-
council cities. Again, although insignificant, this finding provided additional
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refutation of Hypothesis IV, i.e.
,
where mobility was high, turnout was likely
to be low.
Population growth and mobility will now be examined by form of
government and electoral system; and by form of government, electoral system
and region in the following two tables. This analysis will attempt to ascertain
the effect of the combination of form of government, electoral system and region
upon the association of population growth and mobility with voter turnout.
Table XXVI assesses the relationship between voter turnout, and
population growth and mobility, while controlling for the effect of form of
government types and electoral system.
TABLE XXVI
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Characteristics Mayor--Council Manager
P NP P NP
N = 146 94 35 276
% Population change 1950-60 -. 12 -.07 -.. 14 -.07
% Migrants from different
county .08 .02 . 19 .04
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of population growth and mobility variables.
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As indicated in the table, growing cities, regardless of the combination
of governmental form and electoral system, are negatively related to voter
turnout. The correlation, however, was stronger in mayor-council partisan
and manager partisan cities than in other types. Although these correlations
are statistically insignificant, further support was provided for part one of
Hypothesis IV.
Mobility continued to be associated positively with turnout, save one
instance. The correlation of mobility with turnout was negative in mayor-
council nonpartisan cities. Overall conclusive support for the second aspect
of Hypothesis IV was not demonstrated.
Because there are certain historical and cultural factors associated
with region, Table XXVII will analyze population growth and mobility with
turnout by form of government, electoral system and region. The question
explored is what effect does region, combined with form of government and
electoral system, have upon the relationship of population growth and mobility
with turnout.
The data indicated that even with the influence of region controlled,
voter turnout continued to be lower in cities with a rapidly growing population
(with two exceptions) regardless of governmental form or electoral system.
Only in manager partisan cities (. 02) in the North Central was a positive
association between growth and turnout. Although none of the correlations were
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TABLE XXVII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION, GOVERNMENTAL FORM
AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Characteristics and Region
Northeast
% Population change 1950-60
% Migrants from different county
N =
North Central
% Population change 1950-60
% Migrants from different county
N =
South
% Population change 1950-60
% Migrants from different county
N =
Far West
% Population change 1950-60
% Migrants from different county
N =
Mayor-Council Manager
P NP P NP
-.30 -. 14 -.43 *
.08 -.50 . 12
91 14 17 2
-.09 -.21 .02 -. 15
.03 .20 . 13 .33
51 39 16 25
*
-.09 * COOf
*
-. 11 * 1 o 00
* 27 * 113
*
-. 13 * -. 11
*
.36 * . 12
O' 14 O’ 136
Insufficient sample
’ All elections are nonpartisan
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages
of population growth and mobility variables.
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dramatic, the highest happened to be located in mayor-council partisan cities
(-.30) and in manager partisan cities (-.43) in the Northeast.
Interestingly, the positive relationship of mobility with turnout while
continuing in the Northeast in partisan mayor-council cities and in the cities in
the Far West, changed dramatically in nonpartisan mayor-council cities in the
Northeast (-.50), and nonpartisan mayor-council and manager nonpartisan
cities of the South (-. 11 and -.08 respectively).
The data point to the conclusion that a rapidly growing or expanding
population does not enhance the degree of voter turnout in any type of city. This
is true even when the influences of region are taken into account. The only
exception was manager partisan cities in the North Central. Thus, based upon
the evidence presented, it is concluded that the first part of Hypothesis IV is
confirmed on this point, i.e.
,
that a rapidly growing population is likely to
decrease voter turnout.
A mobile population does not have a negative effect upon voter turnout
rate in either type of city in the North Central or the Far West. However, in
non-partisan cities in the South and in non-partisan mayor-council cities of the
Northeast, mobility did result in lower turnout. Therefore, the effect of
region altered the relationship between mobility and turnout in mayor-council
and manager cities, regardless of electoral system.
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The conclusion, then, based on evidence from the greater part of the
analysis is that the second part of Hypothesis IV is not corroborated, i.e., that
mobility is likely to decrease voter turnout, except as a regional phenomenon
in the Northeast and South.
Social Class
.
Hypothesis V suggested that voter turnout was likely to
increase as the percentage of college educated persons in the population in-
creased. Also, it was hypothesized in Hypothesis VI that turnout would be higher
in cities with a higher percentage of white collar employees, homeowners, and
a higher percentage of high income persons than in those cities with high
percentages of opposite characteristics. The following four tables will analyze
these two hypotheses. Table XXVIII shows the correlation coefficients for
the social class variables with voter turnout for all cities.
The data do not provide support for Hypothesis V, that a well-educated
population was likely to increase turnout. This finding apparently refutes
conventional wisdom, for a well-educated population resulted in low turnout.
Subsequent tables will further analyze this finding.
Other surprising findings, which did not confirm Hypothesis VI, were
that white collar workers were negatively related to turnout and that low income
(% populated earning $3,000 or less) resulted in increased turnout. Only %
earning $10,000 or more was positively related to turnout, thus providing the
132
TABLE XXVIII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES
Characteristics All Cities
N = 551
% 4 years of college or more -.06
% white collar workers -. 13
% homeowners .00
% population earning $3,000 or less .02
% population earning $10,000 or more .03
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.
only partial corroboration of Hypothesis VI. The findings on social class may
be altered somewhat once the effects of government, electoral system and region
are controlled.
The data in Table XXIX show the effect of social class variables upon
turnout in mayor-council and manager cities.
With the exception of one variable, social class factors are positively
associated with turnout in manager cities. Thus, in manager cities Hypothesis
V and Hypothesis VI are confirmed, except in one instance, i.e., where high
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TABLE XXIX
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristcs Mayor-Council
N = 240
Manager
N = 311
% population 4 years of college
or more .06 .06
% white collar workers -.33 . 10
% honeowners -.14 .05
% earning $3, 000 or less .01 .03
% earning $10,000 or more .01 -.04
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.
income population was negatively related to turnout, therefore not likely to
result in increased voter turnout.
Although the negative findings in Table XXVIII of education and white
collar workers with turnout disappeared in manager cities, (with the exception
noted), in mayor-council cities only college educated showed a significant
positive relationship to turnout with income (both high and low) again positively
associated with turnout, albeit at a .01 level.
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The data in Table XXX assess the relationship of voter turnout with
social class variables while controlling both for form of government and
electoral system. Cities with a large college -educated population had an
increased turnout rate, whether or not they had mayor-council or manager
governments and partisan or non-partisan elections, thus providing further
confirmation of Hypothesis V.
White collar workers were negatively related to turnout, regardless
of governmental type of electoral system. The negative relationships discovered
in Table XXIX of white collar workers and homeowners to turnout in mayor-
council cities was still apparent when electoral systems were controlled, except
in mayor-council nonpartisan cities where home ownership is_likely to increase
turnout. Negative relationships also appear (contrary to Table XXIX findings)
in manager cities, except for the association between % homeowners and voting
turnout in the nonpartisan manager cities.
Table XXX in addition, offers further substantiation of the findings
of Table XXIX regarding the relationships between income and turnout. Thus
in mayor-council cities the nominally positive association specified in Table
XXIX divides according to electoral form; whereas the relationships between
income and turnout for manager cities in Table XXIX is additionally confirmed
in Table XXX, regardless of electoral form.
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TABLE XXX
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Characteristcs Mayor-
P
N=146
Council
NP
N=94
Manager
P NP
N=35 N=276
% population 4 yrs. college or more .04 .04 .13 .02
% white collar workers -.39 -.32 -26 .00
% homeowners -.32 .21 -.20 .05
% earning $3, 000 or less .08 -.08 . 08 .09
% earning $10,000 or more .02 -.01 -. 16 -.08
The coefficient are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages
of the socio-economic characteristics.
Thus, when turnout and social class factors are analyzed according to
governmental type and electoral system, confirmation of Hypothesis V is
provided, i.e.
,
that voter turnout will be higher in those cities with a higher
percentage of well-educated (college) persons; however, support for Hypothesis
VI is inconclusive.
Because region is posited as an important intervening variable and
the social class factors, governmental forms and electoral systems are located
in different proporitions in different parts of the country, the relationship
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between social class factors and turnout will be analyzed according to region.
Region may help to account for some of the unexplained variance between voter
turnout and social class variables.
The data in Table XXI show the relationship between turnout and
social class variables by region, form of government and electoral system.
In the Northeast and South, a large college -educated population w?as
likely to increase turnout in all cities, regardless of government or electoral
system. Contradicting this finding, however, are the correlations suggesting
that large college educated population decreased turnout in the North Central
and Far West. Therefore, only partial support was provided for Hypothesis V.
The negative relationships in Table XXX of white collar and homeowners
with turnout continued and was strengthened in the Northeast, North Central
and Far West. Furthermore, where percent of homeowners showed a positive
relationship to turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in Table XXX,
controlling for region in Table XXXI resulted in a negative association in all
regions except the South and manager partisan cities in North Central. Also,
percent of white collar showed a negative association with turnout in mayor-
council nonpartisan cities in the South.
The significance of income remained about the same when region was
accounted for, but there were a few exceptions. The negative relationship
between high income and turnout was strengthened in manager partisan cities
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TABLE XXXI
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS BY
REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Region and Social Mayor-Council Manager
Class P NP P NP
Northeast
% 4 yrs. college or more .24 .30 .40 *
% white collar -.45 -.57 -.60 *
% homeowners -.51 -.08 -.32 *
% $3, 000 or under . 11 -. 11 -.04 *
% $10, 000 or over .03 -.08 -.42 *
N = 91 14 17 2
North Central
% 4 yrs. college or more -.28 -. 10 -. 11 -. 12
% white collar -.35 -.60 .00 -.66
% homeowners -.03 -.23 .26 .00
% $3, 000 or under . 10 -. 10 .04 .30
% $10, 000 or over .00 -.09 .34 -.06
N = 51 39 16 25
South
% 4 yrs. college or more * . 12 * .03
% white collar * -.52 * .00
% homeowners * . 10 * .02
% $3, 000 or under * . 10 * . 15
% $10, 000 or over * .08 * . 12
N = 4 27 113
Far West
% 4 yrs. college or more * -. 13 * -.24
% white collar * -.49 * -. 13
% homeowners * -. 16 * -. 15
% $3, 000 or under * -. 10 * .06
% $10, 000 or over * -.65 * .06
N = O' 14 O' 136
Insufficient sample
'All elections are nonpartisan
The Coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages
of the socio-economic characteristics.
in the Northeast and in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West.
In summary, through controlling for the influence of region, support
lor Hypothesis V was provided only in the Northeast and South. Hypothesis VI
was corroborated only in the South. The overall analysis leads to the conclusion
that sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses V and VI is lacking.
Population Homogeneity
.
As hypothesized in Hypothesis VI 1 and
Hypothesis VI II respectively, cities with a high non-white population and a high
ethnic population are likely to have a lower voter turnout rate. Tables XXXI 1,
XXXI II, XXXIV and XXXV provide the analysis of this hypothesis. Table XXXII
shows the relationship between turnout and homogeneity for all cities.
TABLE XXXI
1
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY
Characteristics All Cities
N =551
% non-white .03
% foreign born .04
% population native-mixed parentage .00
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.
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The data indicated that culturally and socially hererogeneous cities
resulted in increased turnout at the polls. Although the correlations were
insignificant, Hypothesis VII and Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large non-white
population decreases voter turnout and that a large ethnic population results in
low turnout, respectively, were refuted by the findings of this table. Table
XXXIII attempts to discover the effect of form of government on these findings.
It provides the association between voter turnout and population homogeneity by
form of government.
TABLE XXXIII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
N = 240 N = 311
% non-white . 10 -.09
% foreign born .02 .05
% population native-mixed parentage .04 .08
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentage of the population homogeneity characteristics.
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In ma.n3.ger cities, a large non—white population was likely to result
in a low voter turnout. None of the correlations in Table XXXIII, however,
were strong, although a positive association continued to exist between turnout
and population homogeneity, except non-white in manager cities.
The findings in Table XXXIII did not corroborate Hypothesis VII and
Hypothesis VIII, i.e.
,
that a large non-white population will lower turnout
and that ethnicity in great proportions in the population will lead to a low voter
turnout respectively. But does it make a difference in turnout whether or not
elections are partisan or nonpartisan in mayor-council and manager cities?
Table XXXIV deals with this question.
TABLE XXXIV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Characteristics Mayor-Council Manager
P NP P NP
N=146 N=94 N=35 N=276
% non-white . 15 .01 -.35 -.06
% foreign born -.08 . 14 . 18 -.05
% population native-mixed parentage .02 .02 . 18 .07
The corefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.
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In those cities with mayor-council government, a high non-white
population, foreign born and native-mixed parentage population were likely to
increase turnout, regardless of election type, except for foreign born in mayor-
council partisan cities where a low turnout resulted. Substantial non-white
population in manager cities, whether or not they had partisan or non-partisan
elections, depressed voter turnout rate. There was a relatively high correlation
(-.35) of non-white population and turnout in manager partisan cities. Weak
positive relationships existed between turnout, foreign-born and native-mixed
parentage population in all manager cities, except in manager nonpartisan cities
where foreign-born population did not contribute to a greater turnout.
Hypothesis VII is supported in manager cities but not in mayor-council
cities, while part of Hypothesis VIII is not substantiated by Table XXXIV, i.e.
,
that high ethnic population, (foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population)
are unequally distributed across regions, the relevant question is what is the
relationship of population homogeneity to turnout when the effects of region are
held constant? Will support for Hypothesis VIII be provided and/or more
clearly delineated?
Table XXXV shows the relationship between voter turnout and population
homogeneity by form of government and electoral system while controlling for
the influence of region.
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The data indicated that non-white population positive association with
turnout still appeared in mayor-council cities, both partisan and nonpartisan,
except in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West. In the Far West,
a large non-white population was likely to result in a lower voter turnout rate.
In manager cities, the negative relationship between non-white population and
turnout still existed, regardless of region or electoral system.
A low turnout in mayor-council partisan cities where there was a large
foreign-born population again prevailed in Table XXXV regardless of region.
The highest correlation was in the North Central (-.31). The positive association
of foreign born with voter turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities indicated
in Table XXXIV disappeared in the South and North Central in Table XXXV,
but was strengthened in the Northeast and Far West. A sizeable native population
was likely to increase turnout only in Northeast mayor-council partisan cities,
North Central mayor-council nonpartisan cities.
The analysis of non-white population in Table XXXV confirmed
Hypothesis VII in manager cities. But in mayor-council cities, support was
obtained only in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West. It is
concluded, then, that a large non-white population was likely to decrease turn-
out in manager cities but not in mayor-council cities.
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TABLE XXXV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Region and Population Mayor--Council Manager
Homogeneity P NP P NP
Northeast
% Non-white .20 . 14 -.46 *
% Foreign born
% Population native-mixed
-.01
.
18 .34 *
parentage -. 11 -.21 . 29 *
N = 91 14 17 2
North Central
% Non -white . 10 .03 -.23 -.07
% Foreign Born
% Population native-mixed
-.31 -.06 -.01 -.02
parentage -.06 . 17 .09 -.01
N = 51 39 16 25
South
-.12% Non -white * .09 *
% Foreign born
% Population native-mixed
*
-.03
-. 14
**
.06
.05
parentage *
113N = 4 27
Far West
-. 17% Non -white * -.24
*
% Foreign born
% Population native-mixed
*
.58 * -.01
-.05
136
parentage
N =
*
O'
-. 14
14
*
0’
Insufficient sample
'All elections are nonpartisan
The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of
the population homogeneity characteristics.
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For the most part evidence for Hypothesis VIII was scattered. No
suppoit is available in the Northeast and Far IVest for the foreign-born aspect
of Hypothesis VIII, i.e.
,
that a large foreign-born population will decrease
turnout. On the other hand, a large foreign-born population in the South and
North Central was likely to result in low turnout. Corroboration of the second
aspect of Hypothesis VIII, i.e.
,
that a large native-mixed parentage population
will lead to low turnout is not provided in Northeast mayor-council partisan
cities, North Central mayor-council nonpartisan cities and South mayor-council
partisan cities. In all manager cities and other mayor-council cities this
aspect of Hypothesis VIII was confirmed. It is concluded that whether or not a
large ethnic population decreases turnout depends to some extent upon region
and election type, especially in mayor-council cities. Therefore, Hypothesis
VIII was not completely supported by the data.
Form of Government, Electoral System, Socio-Economic Characteristics
and Voter Turnout - Part III . Table XXXVT presents the combined effects of
socio-economic characteristics upon voter turnout for each region by form of
government and electoral system.
As the table suggests, population growth and mobility, population
homogeneity, and social class characteristics appear to have greater predictive
power upon voter turnout in the Northeast and North Central. Evidence for the
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Far West and South was rather inconclusive because in the South the sample
size was insufficient for further analysis on mayor-council partisan and manager
partisan cities, and the Far West had no partisan cities
. The highest degree of
variance on voter turnout explained by the socio-economic variables as shown in
Table XXXVI was in the Northeast mayor-council partisan cities (89%) and
manager partisan cities (86%). hi the North Central area, 51 percent of the
variation in turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities and 71 percent of the
variation in manager nonpartisan cities were explained by these socio-economic
characteristics.
In mayor-council nonpartisan cities (46%) in the South, these socio-
economic characteristics were also significant in explaining the variation in
voter turnout. In other cities of the South and in all cities in the Far West, these
characteristics were virtually useless as explanatory factors in voter turnout
variance
.
Summary
Although region vas treated as having an independent effect upon turnout,
it was decidedly difficult to separate the influence of region from the influences
of form of government and type of electoral system, for these are distributed
unequally across regions. However, some distinctive patterns did emerge in
the analysis of the data of which note can be taken.
It may be recalled that Hypothesis I indicated that mayor-council
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governments were more likely to experience greater voter turnout than manager
governments. This assertion was supported by the data in Table XVII I.
Positing region as an intervening variable resulted in analyzing whether or not
this relationship also existed within region. Table XIX revealed that mayor-
council cities had a larger turnout in all regions except the Northeast. Thus,
based on the analysis by region, Hypothesis I is again supported by the data.
In Hypothesis II, it was hypothesized that turnout was likely to be
larger in partisan cities than nonpartisan cities. This assumption was
corroborated by the findings as indicated in Table XX. Turnout was almost
10% greater in partisan cities than turnout in nonpartisan cities. However,
analyzing the association within region (Table XXI) resulted in inconclusive
evidence. Nonpartisan cities in the North Central were likely to have a greater
turnout (2%) than partisan elections in the North Central, and turnout was the
same as that of partisan elections in the Northeast. Furthermore, nonpartisan-
ship in the Northeast and North Central were likely to result in greater voter
turnout than either partisan or nonpartisan elections in the South and Far West.
The only clear evidence to support Hypothesis II was provided in the Northeast
and South. Because the Far West had no partisan elections, it could not be
considered. Therefore, based on the analysis it was evident that form of
election was more important in the Northeast in generating a large turnout than
form of government, while in the other regions form of government was likely
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to be more significant. A word or caution is advised. As indicated in Table
XVII, the South and Far West had a lower voter turnout than the Northeast and
North Central. But, the Far West and South also had, as shown in Table XIX,
more manager and nonpartisan cities, factors which depress turnout, than the
other regions.
The data in Table XXII confirmed Hypothesis III, that mayor-council
partisan cities were likely to attract more people to the polls than cities with
other types. But, controlling for the influences of region, in Table XXIII,
eliminated this relationship. However, the absence of partisan elections in the
Far West and the paucity of manager cities in the Northeast rendered this finding
virtually meaningless. In the South and North Central, the type of government
appeared more significant in stimulating a substantial turnout than electoral
system.
Nonpartisanship did have a negative effect upon turnout. This finding
g
corroborates the results of some earlier studies. Even in cities with manager
governments, partisan elections increased turnout much greater than in manager
cities with nonpartisan elections. Thus, partisan elections do stimulate greater
turnout whether they be held in manager or mayor-council cities.
8Lee and Alford, o£. ciL; Lee,_o£. cit. ; Bollens and Schmandt, o£. ciL;
and Thomas Flinn, Local Government and Politics (Glenview, III. : Scott Foresman
and Company, 1970), 39.
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The data also indicated, as was suggested in Hypothesis I that a
growing population resulted unequivocally in a diminution of turnout rate, form
of government, electoral system and region notwithstanding. However,
confirmation for the second part of Hypothesis IV was lacking as a mobile
population did not seem to affect turnout negatively. In fact, where there was
high mobility, voter turnout was likely to increase, except in mayor-council
nonpartisan cities. When region was controlled only in the South did increased
mobility of population result in decreased turnout.
Concerning Hypothesis V and VI, it was found before considering the
effect of region that in mayor-council cities, a higher percentage of educated
persons in the population, white collar workers and homeowners were likely to
negatively affect turnout. Uneven support was provided for the assumption that
voter turnout would increase as the percentage of high income persons in the
population increases.
These findings were also applicable for the most part, in cities with
partisan elections - mostly mayor-council governments - and in nonpartisan
elections, white collar workers depressed turnout.
The consideration of region as an intervening variable resulted in a
continuing correlation between white collar workers and low voter turnout
except in the South. Education (college educated) most often resulted in lower
turnout, especially in the Far West and North Central and only in mayor-
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council partisan cities of the Northeast and South.
Based upon the data, conclusive corroboration of Hypothesis VII and
VIII was not apparent. If anything, evidence providing a partial refutation of
these two Hypotheses occurred. Populations which were socially and culturally
diverse experienced greater turnout than a homogeneous population. In other
words, a high percentage of non-white persons and foreign-born and native
persons in the population were not likely to lead to higher voter turnout.
However, because the concentration of a non-white population in manager cities
was not great, negative influences on turnout were evident. Substantial foreign-
born and native populations (ethnicity) increased turnout at a greater rate in
manager cities than in mayor-council cities. But, foreign born populations were
likely to decrease turnout in mayor-council partisan cities regardless of region.
Although non-white population was positively associated with mayor-council
cities, this did not hold true in the South and Far West.
Region as an intervening variable affects the relationship between voter
turnout and socio-economic characteristics as significantly as form of govern-
ment and electoral systems. As explanatory factors of voter turnout and socio-
economic characteristics it is, therefore, more useful to rely upon form of
government and electoral systems, for as was discovered in the previous chapter
certain socio-economic factors are found in particular governmental forms and
electorcal types more so than others, regardless of region.
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CHAPTER V I
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The local electorate in American society has not been sufficiently
aroused to its electoral responsibility and the significance of local politics, or,
indeed, it is discreetly and acutely aware that voting is of little value and
significance in deciding the real issues of local politics. In this study well
over 50 percent of those persons eligible to vote remained away from the polls.
Consequently, municipal elections continue to attract only a minority of the
electorate - a minority who must vote into office those persons who shall make
and decide paramount policy issues concerning all local residents. A study of
city elections in Los Angeles over a period of two decades revealed that voter
turnout ranged from 10 to 61 percent, with an average of 41 percent of those
eligible to vote. However, some find this situation healthy, for it insures that
the "better more capable" elements of local citizenry - those who are better
educated, better informed, and of higher socio-economic status generally -
ultimately decide who shall hold office. But the majority of the local electorate
1 Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los
Angeles County (Los Angeles: Bureau of Government Research, University of
California, 1953).
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must be awakened to the fact that it cannot afford to abdicate its responsibility
of voting for officials to a few - regardless of how insignificant it considers
the mere act of voting for a mayor or for councilmen. Apathy in municipal
elections, undoubtedly, must be overcome. There are obviously many reasons
for an apathetic municipal electorate. But Charles Adrian states that "the
principal reason for apathy in municipal elections, is likely to be a pervasive
consensus, i.e.
,
there may be widespread agreement in the community as to
the kinds of persons who are wanted in public office, as to expenditure levels
and as to public policies. Under such circumstances, there is little incentive
o
for any but the most conscientious voter to go to the polls. " Hugh Bone
observed that "many cities are controlled or strongly influenced over long
periods of time by what is loosely viewed as 'the establishment, ' with strong
bipartisan composition. Aided by broadly composed municipal leagues and
citizens associations, its supporters can be depended on to turn out and to have
much to do with the attention or lack of attention focused on the city election.
3
This effort affects both the turnout and the types of voters going to the polls. "
This study was undertaken to explore further the phenomenon of voter
turnout in municipal elections. The attempt has been to analyze certain forms
of government and socio-economic characteristics which may act as stimulants
2
Charles Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw Hill
Book Co.
,
1961), 93.
^Hugh Bone, American Politics and the Party System (3d ed. ; New York
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1965), 528.
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or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout. Most of the previous
studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore
many of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout were derived
from such studies. However, a few studies have investigated voter turnout
locally with similar assumptions as a basis. This study not only investigated
and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced
region as an intervening variable. In most cases, the findings confirm those
of earlier works, but in some cases they differ.
Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant
in positively affecting the level of voter turnout in municipal elections. In every
instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of turnout
in all cities. But within the limited parameters of accountable variation, some
pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and turn-
out developed. Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis
of socio-economic characteristics:
1. A rapidly growing population led to a reduced voter turnout.
2. Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily
experience low voter turnout.
3. Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons did not
necessarily have a larger turnout than cities with a high per-
centage of less-well -educated persons. In general, education
(well educated and less well educated) decreased voter turn-
out. In mayor-council cities, however, a large less-well-
educated population reduced turnout.
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4. Basically a high percentage of white collar workers and
homeowners, factors normally associated with high voter
turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout. Income (high
and low) resulted in increased turnout.
5. Cities with a large non-white population did not necessarily
have low voter turnout. But in manager cities, non-white
population was negatively related to turnout, while in
mayor-council cities a large non-white population in-
creased turnout, especially in mayor-council partisan
cities in the Northeast and North Central.
6. Ethnicity (i.e., foreign-born and native -mixed parentage
persons) in large proportions in the population led to
increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial
foreign-born and native -mixed parentage population
resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in
mayor-council cities.
The conclusions derived from this analysis were:
1. Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger
turnout than cities with manager governments, except
in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly
higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2. Basically, manager governments had the effect of
discouraging a large turnout.
3. Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter
turnout than cities with partisan elections.
4. Cities with mayor-council-partisan governments had
a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But when
this relationship was viewed within regions, only in the
North Central was it likely that mayor-council-partisan
cities had a higher turnout than cities with other
combinations of governmental forms and electoral
systems.
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5. Region as an intervening variable had greater significance
as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures
as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic
characteristics as determinants of turnout.
The above are the more salient conclusions emerging from this study of
municipal voter turnout. As with all conclusions, denuded of the shield of
interpretation and explication, they stand virtually meaningless. Therefore,
one is compelled to query what they mean or what do they actually say or
explain. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will deal with the
implications of these conclusions for voting in municipal elections in particular
and voter turnout in general.
Because no distinction was made between cities with the elected mayor
and cities with the appointed mayor, care must be exercised in assessing the
relationship between mayor-council cities and voter turnout since an appointed
mayor may be in a similar relative position as a manager in affecting turnout
when compared to an elected mayor. But it can only be speculated at this
point that turnout would probably be still larger in cities with appointed mayors
than in cities with managers.
Mayor-council cities embody the basic elements of acute social
cleavages and tension which leads to heightened social activity in particular.
This condition ultimately results in greater tunrout in local elections of people
using the vote to express their grievances or their support for particular
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candidates and policies. Also, the mayor is more visible and more of a focal
point for the electorate to rally around and support or on which to vent their
spleen and exercise a protest vote. Furthermore, he makes no pretense of
being non -political. The competition and conflict which exist between the mayor
and not only ambitious mayorality-oriented councilmen, but councilmen who may
be genuinely opposed to the mayor's policies increase the excitement, interest,
and turnout in a municipal election.
By contrast, manager governments are located in cities with the basic
elements of a middle-class society, factors which supposedly heighten turnout.
But, because these cities are essentially homogeneous in character, they are
basically consensual and the inhabitants express a certain self-satisfaction
with the way things are run which ultimately depresses or decreases the turnout
at local elections.
Partisan elections generate cleavages, divisions and tensions which in
turn increase political activity and turnout. The interplay of political parties
upon the electorate and the exhortation by parties encouraging people to vote,
combined with the fact that many people depend on party labels as guides to
voting undoubtedly engender a larger turnout for local elections than where non-
partisanship exists.
Nonpartisanship may have succeeded in accomplishing some of its goals
as part of the reform movement; it unquestionably has not brought about a
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more democratic local politics through the encouragement and achievement of
greater electoral participation at the local level. 4 It has resulted in a situation
in which fewer people turn out to vote in municipal elections than in those
elections held under a partisan electoral system. Without the cues provided by
party labels and the possibility for a "protest vote, " sufficient motivation for
voting for some people has been effectively eliminated by nonpartisanship.
However, with over 60 percent of cities presently utilizing the nonpartisan ballot,
and the prospects that more cities will eventually adopt it, the dichotomy between
nonpartisan and partisan elections will become unimportant and lose its validity,
if it hasn't already, as a device for analyzing the differences in voter turnout
between the two systems. Parties will continue to exist and operate as they
do now, in some cases overtly; but other more analytically useful and pertinent
5
political lines will develop, as has been suggested already, which may be more
effective in stimulating turnout.
For some other consequences of nonpartisanship, see Charles Adrian,
"Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections, " American Political
Science Review, 46 (September, 1952), 766-776; Richard Childs, Civic
Victories (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Eugene Lee and Robert Alford,
"Voter Turnout in American Cities, " American Political Science Review
,
62
(September, 1968), 796; Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960).
5
Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group-Voting in Non-Partisan Elections, "
Public Opinion Quarterly
,
30 (Spring, 1966), 79.
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Where the mayor and councilmen campaign with the benefit of party
label, their character, visibility, and notoriety, to say nothing of the party's
image and efforts in their behalf, would undoubtedly be of such a nature that it
would stimulate a large turnout. What is also significant is that the mayor and
councilman are visible symbols for protest and support. They are also perceived
as the holders of power and authority.
The mayor as well as the councilmen campaigning on the party label can
generate the necessary interest in the election for a huge turnout. Councilmen
give voters a certain personal attachment to the campaign and election. This
attachment reflects in various forms of support, but for most people it is the
casting of a ballot for their particular choice.
In their study, Wolfinger and Field concluded that "one can do a much
better job of predicting a city's political forms by knowing what part of the
country it is in than by knowing anything about the composition of its population. "
They continue: "The reasons for this may lie in certain regional historical
experiences related to the influx of immigrants and the responses to their
0
needs reflected in municipal political systems. " The conclusion concerning
region in this study is similar to that of Wolfinger and Field. Having a know-
^Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the
Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review , 60 (June,
1966), 320.
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ledge about the regions of the country provides a clearer and more distinctive
picture of the forms of government therein than the socio-economic character-
istics, and this in turn tells us more about voter turnout in each region. For
instance, the Far West has more manager governments and nonpartisan
elections than the Northeast, which has more mayor-council types and partisan
elections. Likewise, the Far West has a lower voter turnout than the North-
east. Socio-economic characteristics are more volatile, hence subject to
more intermittent change than governmental forms. Therefore, knowing the
section of the country says less about socio-economic characteristics per se
than governmental forms.
Although this study basically concurs with Ruth Dixon, ’’that a high level
of mobility in the American population makes residence requirements especially
7
significant as factors barring persons from voting, " the findings here suggest
that turnout is not necessarily hindered by high level mobility. Residency re-
quirements vary tremendously from locale to locale. In some cities the re-
quirement is reasonably short, while in others it is unjustifiably long. However,
given the type of people who are usually highly mobile - white collar workers -
7
Ruth Dixon, ’’Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections,” (unpublished
M. A. thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1966), 6.
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the suspicion is that they are not deterred from immediately becoming politically
active, registered and eventually voting.
With Congress lecently passing a law limiting long residency requirement
as a prerequisite in voting for the Presidency, it can be expected that in the near
future, with increasing mobility among the electorate, that residency require-
ments for voting in local elections may uniformly be limited to no more than
three months or less in many American cities.
The socio-economic variables utilized in this study, variables which
are commonly used in such studies, contributed very little to the overall
variation in voter turnout. However, it is still possible to comment on the
findings, even within this limited area of significance. Some of the findings fly
in the face of conventional wisdom. Lee and Alford also found this to be true
g
of education in their study. White collar workers, homeowners, and education
were found to be inversely related to turnout in this study. It is suggested,
however, as Lee and Alford did, that the relationship may be curvilinear rather
than linear. They observed that ’’although better-educated individuals may
indeed vote more frequently than less-educated individuals, less well-educated
communities vote more (or at least not less) than well-educated communities.”9
This same analysis is also applicable to the findings of white collar
workers, homeowners, and education in this study. Sufficient motivation
^ Lee and Alford, o£. cit.
,
805.
9 Ibid.
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growing out of discussion of issues and in some cases the appeal of personalities
will attract all ranges of voters to the polls in large numbers, regardless of
socio-economic status. For instance, it was thought that because homeowners
had a stake in the community they would be more apt to vote then renters. But.
on the other hand, renters have a stake in the community as well; they pay
property taxes indirectly, of course, and they are equally affected by public
policies. Therefore, it can be expected that in communities with substantial
renters, these renters will contribute substantially to the voter turnout rate -
if not more than homeowners, at least equally.
These socio-economic variables did not have much predictive power nor
were they significant in explaining a lower or higher turnout in either mayor-
council partisan or nonpartisan and manager partisan or nonpartisan cities.
However, in manager partisan cities in the Northeast, they did contribute 86 per-
cent to the variation in turnout. In manager nonpartisan cities in the North
Central area they accounted for only 71 percent of the variation in the vote. In
both mayor-council partisan and mayor-council nonpartisan in the Northeast, these
socio-economic variables contributed a mere 43 percent and 89 percent,
respectively, to the variation in voter turnout.
The undeniable situation which prevailed in cities with either mayor-
council partisan or nonpartisan and manager partisan or nonpartisan govern-
mental and electoral systems was that the greatest variance in voter turnout was
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left unexplained by the socio-economic variables. However, given the relative
affluency of the American electorate generally, the increasing political awareness
and consciousness of the electroate, socio-economic variables should become
less relevant and significant as determinants of voter turnout.
The data also indicated that a politically, culturally and socially
heterogeneous community resulted in an increased turnout at the polls. Cleavages
and conflicts generate spontaneously in highly heterogeneous cities, and they
eventually are resolved or ameliorated in the political arena. For the great
majority of non-white, foreign-born and native populations, who are the sources
of conflict and cleavage, their only contribution to resolution or dampening of
conflict may be the ballot box. They therefore rely on influencing policy
decisions and the selection of the decision makers through turning out in large
numbers.
Large non -white, foreign-born and native-mixed parentage populations
increased turnout in cities. Non -white population exhibited the closest relation-
ship. In manager cities, however, only a substantial non-white population led
to depressing the turnout rate. The largest single group which comprises the
non -white population is the Black American. Some earlier studies have shown
that in those cities where Blacks have the opportunity and the necessary
encouragement to vote, they turn out in equal or greater numbers than
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whites. 10 Furthermore, voting may be the primary and, in some cases, the
only means whereby Blacks can attempt to influence and affect policy decisions.
Whites may find private avenues more conducive to their needs and thus
utilize such avenues as a substitute for voting. Mayor-council cities have the
tendency to make available the opportunity, and they have the necessary presence
of stimuli to vote, more so than manager cities.
An additional finding was that the foreign-born and the native population
had a stronger association to turnout in manager cities than they had in mayor-
council cities. The expectation was that the native population would be more
closely related to turnout in manager cities. It is little surprising, however, to
find foreign-born population with a closer relationship to turnout in manager
cities than mayor-council. It seems that they would follow the general pattern
of non-white voting. However, as some have argued, ethnic saliency may be
a thing of the past, for ethnics have been finally assimilated into the American
political system. 11 As ethnics rise in socio-economic status they apparently
not only move to manager cities but become less attached to ethnic considerations.
10Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1960 ), 294 -295 .
^Wolfinger and Field, o£. cit.
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Turnout should continue to be high where there is a substantial admixture
of non-whites, foreign-born and native population, for these are some of the
ingredients which make for conflict, sometimes violent, which ultimately
electorally expresses itself at the polls. Foreign-born people seem to have
adopted or assimilated generally the orientation of the native population in that
they, as well as the natives, turn out to vote in greater numbers in manager
cities than in mayor-council cities. This also reflects the fact that the foreign-
born have placed their fortunes on ’'non-political 1 ' manager cities. Although
ethnic voting has not vanished, the probability is that ethnic salience is radically
diminished in manager cities.
Forms of government are instituted to confer electoral and political
advantages on one group of people over another group. The structures so
introduced, therefore, may hinder or encourage full political participation.
It is clear that some structures do in fact generate a large turnout while others
depress voter turnout.
The basic conclusion drawn from this study is that political structures
are very important determinants of voter turnout in municipal elections, and
that forms of government are most significant than socio-economic variables
as causal elements in voter turnout. Therefore, studies of voter turnout would
do well to emphasize more the role and effect of political structures on the
electorate and ultimately on turnout.
165
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Adrian, Charles. Governing Urban America
. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.
Adrian, Charles. State and Local Government
.
New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1960.
Aggers, Robert, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson. The Rulers and the
Ruled
. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964.
Alford, Robert and Harry Scoble. Bureaucracy and Participation: Political
Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities
.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970.
Babcock, Robert. State and Local Government and Politics
.
New York:
Random House, 1956.
Banfield, Edward and James Q. Wilson. City Politics . New York: Vintage
Books, 1963.
Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee. Voting . Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954.
Blair, George S. American Local Government. New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1964.
Blalock, Hubert. Casual Inferences in Nonexperimental Research . Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
Blalock, Hubert. Social Statistics . New York: McGraw Hill Book Co. , 1960.
Boskoff, Alvin and Harmon Ziegler. Voting Patterns in a Local Election .
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.
,
1964.
Bowen, Don R. Political Behavior of the American Public. Columbus, Ohio:
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968.
Bromage, Arthur. Introduction to Municipal Government and Administration .
New York: Appleton-Crofts, Inc. , 1957.
166
Bryce, James. American Commonwealth. New York: MacMillan Co.
,
1891.
Burdick, Eugene and A. J. Brodbeck, (eds.) American Voting Behavior
.
Glencoe, 111. : The Free Press, 1959.
Campbell, Angus,
_et aL The Voter Decides. Evanston: How, Peterson and
Co., 1954.
Campbell, Angus. The American Voter
. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.
Campbell, Angus and H. Cooper. Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes
.
Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1956.
Childs, Richard. Civic Victories. New York: Harper and Row, 1952.
Cohen, Lillian. Statistical Methods for Social Scientists
.
New York: Prentice
Hall, 1954.
Dreyer, Edward C. and Walter A. Rosenbaum, (eds.) Political Opinion and
Electoral Behavior
. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
,
1966.
Dye, Thomas. Politics in States and Communities
.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1969.
East, John Porter. Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought of its
Founder Richard S. Childs . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1965.
Elazar, Daniel. Federalism: A View From the States. New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Co.
,
1966.
Fairlie, John A. Municipal Administration . New York: MacMillan Co. , 1901.
Festinger, Leon and Daniel Katz. Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1953.
Goodall, Leonard. The American Metropolis . Columbus, Ohio: Charles E.
Merrill Publishing Co.
,
1968.
Goodnow, Frank. City Government in the United States . New York: The
Century Co.
,
1904.
167
Griffith, Ernest S. History of American City Government
. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1938.
Harder, Marvin A. Nonpartisan Elections: A Political Illusion? New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co.
,
1958.
Hofstadter, Richard. Age of Reform
.
New York: Vintage Books, 1955.
Institute of Public Affairs. Forms of City Government. 4th ed. Austin:
University of Texas, 1956.
Jacobs, Herbert and Kenneth Vines, (eds.). Politics in the American States:
A Comparative Analysis. New York: Little Brown Co., 1965.
Jennings, M. Kent and Harmon Ziegler, (eds.). The Electoral Process.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966.
Kammerer, Gladys, Charles Farris, John DeGrove and Alfred Clubok. The
Urban Political Community
.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
,
1963.
Kammerer, Gladys, et al. City Managers in Politics . Gainesville: University
of Florida Monograph: Social Science, No. 13 (Winter, 1962).
Kent, F. R. The Great Game of Politics . New York: Doubleday and Co. , 1923.
Key, V. O. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups . 5th ed. New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964.
Kneier, Charles M. City Government in The United States . 3rd ed. New York:
Harper Bros.
,
1957.
Lane, Robert. Political Life . Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959.
Lazarsfeld, Paul and Bernard Berelson. The People's Choice . New York
Columbia University Press, 1944.
Lee, Eugene. Politics of Nonpartisanship: A Study of California City Elections .
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
Lerner, Daniel and Harold Lasswell, (eds.). The Policy Sciences. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1960.
168
Lockard, Duane. The Politics of State and Local Government. New York:
MacMillan Co.
,
1963.
Macridis, Roy. The Study of Comparative Government. New York: Doubledav
1955.
Maddox, Russell. Issues in State and Local Government. New York: Van
Nostrand, 1965.
Merton, Robert. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, III.: Free
Press, 1957.
Milbraith, Lester. Political Participation
.
Chicago: Rand McNally Co.
,
1964.
Milbraith, Lester. Political Participation
. Chicago: Rand McNally Co.
,
1965.
Municipal Year Book. Chicago: International City Manager’s Association, 1965,
1968, 1969.
Munro, William B. Municipal Government and Administration. New York:
MacMillan Co., 1930, Vol. 1.
Munro, William B. The Government of American Cities . 3rd ed. New York:
MacMillan Co.
,
1920.
Munro, William B. City Government By Commission . New York: D. Appleton
and Co.
,
1914.
Phillips, Jewel Cass. State and Local Government in America. New York:
American Book Co.
,
1954.
Phillips, Jewel Cass. Municipal Government and Administration in America .
New York: MacMillan Co., 1960.
Reed, Thomas. Municipal Government in the United States . New York: D.
Appleton-Century Company, 1934.
Ridley, Clarence and Orens F. Nolting. The City Manager Profession .
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.
169
Riordon, W. L. Plunkitt of Tammany Hall
. New York: Doubleday and Co.
Inc., 1905.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Age of Jackson
. Boston: Little Brown and Co
1945.
Schnore, Leo and Henry Fagin, (eds.). Urban Research and Policy Planning
.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1967.
Selltiz, Claire, Marie Jakoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook.
Research Methods in Social Relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1962 „
Senders, Virginia L. Measurement and Statistics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958.
Snider, Clyde. American State and Local Government
. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1965.
Steffens, Lincoln. The Shame of the Cities. New York: McClure, Phillips and
Co., 1904.
Steffens, Lincoln. Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens . New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc.
,
1931.
Stevens, Lewis. Commission Government and Municipal Manager Law . New
Jersey: Albert Hand, 1924.
Stone, Harold A.
,
Don Price and Kathryn H. Stone. City Manager Government
in the United States . Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940.
Story, Russell. American Municipal Executive . Urbana: University of Illinois
1918.
Williams, Oliver and Charles Press. Democracy in Urban America. Chicago:
Rand McNally Co., 1961.
Williams, Oliver and Charles Adrian. Four Cities: A Study in Comparative
Policy Making. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.
170
Wood, Robert C. Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1959.
Zink, Harold. City Bosses in the United States. Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1930.
Articles and Periodicals
Adrian, Charles. "Leadership and Decision-making in Manager Cities: A
Study of Three Communities." Public Administration Review
.
18
(Summer, 1958), 208-222.
Adrian, Charles. "The City Manager As A Leader." Public Administration
Review
,
18 (Summer, 1958), 208-213.
Adrian, Charles. "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections."
American Political Science Review
,
XLVI (Sept. 1952), 766-776.
Adrian, Charles. "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections. " Western Political
Quarterly. 12 (1959), 449-58.
Agger, Robert and Vincent Ostrum. "Political Participation in a Small
Community. InEulauetal. (ed.). Political Behavior. Glencoe
111.: The Free Press, 1956.
Alford, Robert. "The Comparative Study of Urban Politics. " Leo Schnore
and Henry Fabra (eds.). Urban Research and Policy Planning
Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1967.
Alford, Robert. "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior. "
Western Political Science Quarterly
,
16 (March, 1963), 180-194.
Alford, Robert. "Suggested Index of the Relation of Voting to Social Class.
"
Public Opinion Quarterly
,
26 (1962), 417-25.
Alford, Robert and Harry Scoble. "Sources of Local Political Involvement.
"
American Political Science Review , 62 (December, 1968), 1192-1206.
Alford, Robert and Harry Scoble. "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics
of American Cities. " Municipal Year Book , 1965, 82-97.
171
Anton, Thomas. "Power, Pluralism and Local Politics. " Administrative
Science Quarterly
, 7 (March, 1963), 425-57.
Banfield, Edward C. and James Q. Wilson. "Public Regardingness As a Value
Premise in Voting Behavior. " American Political Science Review. 58
(Dec. 1964), 876-87.
— ~ ’
Beard, Charles. "Politics and City Government. " National Municipal Review,
6 (March, 1917), 201-5.
Bromage, Arthur W. "Partisan Elections in Cities." National Municipal
Review 40 (1951), 250-53.
Campbell, Angus. "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change. "
Public Opinion Quarterly
, 24 (Fall, 1960), 397-418.
Campbell, Angus. "Voters and Elections: Past and Present." Journal of
Politics
,
26 (1964).
Childs, Richard. "500 Nonpartisan Elections. " National Municipal Review
(1949).
"City Bosses and Political Machines." The Annals
,
(May, 1964).
Clark, James W. "Environment, Process and Policy. " American Political
Science Review
,
63 (December, 1969).
Coulter, Philip B. "Community Social Structure and Political Party
Competition: A Comparative Analysis, " (unpublished manuscript),
1968.
Crain, Robert L. and Donald Rosenthal. "Community Status as a Dimension of
Local Decision-making. " American Sociological Review
,
32 (Dec.
1967), 970-984.
Cutright, Philip. "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems in American Cities."
Comparative Studies in Society and History , 5 (January, 1963), 218.
Daland, Robert. "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism. " American
Political Science Review
,
51 (June, 1957), 491-509.
Dixon, Ruth. "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections." (Unpublished
M. A. Thesis, Dept, of Sociology, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1966).
172
Dixon, Ruth B. "The Reform Movement in American City Government: Has
Democracy Been Sacrificed to Economy ?" (Unpublished paper, Dept,
of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1965).
Easton, David. "The Current Meaning of Behaviorism in Political Science. "
In James Charlesworth The Limits of Behaviorism in Political Science
,
Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962.
Editorial. "Revolt of the 'Independents. ’" National Municipal Review (now)
National Civic Review
,
40:564-565, December, 1951.
Freeman, J. Lieper. "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and
A Case Analysis. " American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), 282„
Froman, Lewis A. "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities. Journal of
Politics
,
29 (February, 1967), 94-108.
Gilbert, Charles E. "Some Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities."
Midwest Journal of Politics, 6 (1962), 346-62.
Gilbert, Charles and Christopher Clague. "Electoral Competition and Electoral
Systems in Large Cities. " Journal of Politics, 24 (May, 1962), 330.
Goldberg, Arthur S. "Discerning A Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting. "
In Norman R. Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy .
Homewood, III. : Dorsey Press, 1968.
Greer, Scott. "The Social Structure and Political Process of Suburbia: An
Empirical Test. " American Sociological Review , 25 (August, 1960),
514-526.
Hastings, Philip K. "The Voter and the Non-Voter. " American Journal of
Sociology
,
62 (Nov., 1956), 302-307.
Herson, Lawrence. "The LostWorid of Municipal Politics. " American Political
Science Review, 51 (June, 1957), 330-345.
Hofferbert, Richard. "The Relationship Between Public Policy and Some
Structural and Environmental Variables in American States, American
Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82.
173
Jacobs, Heibert and Michael Lipsky. 'Outputs, Structures and Power: An
Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Policies."
In Marian Urish (ed.), Political Science: Advances of the Discipline
.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968.
"
Janowitz, Morris and Dwaine Marvick. "Competitive Pressures and
Democratic Consent. " In Heinz Enlan, S. J. Eldersveld and
Morris Janowitz (eds. ), Political Behavior. New York: The Free
Press, 1956.
Kelley, Stanley, Jr.
,
Richard Ayers and William Bowen. "Registration and
Voting: Putting First Things First." American Political Science
Review
,
61 (June, 1967), 374.
Kessel, John H. "Government Structure and Political Environment: A
Statistical Note About American Cities. " American Political Science
Review
,
(Sept, 1962), 615-620.
Key, V. O. 'The Politically Relevant in Surveys." Public Opinion Quarterly
,
24 (1960), 54-61.
Key, V. O. and Frank Munger. "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision:
The Case of Indiana. " In Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck
(eds.), American Voting Behavior
,
Glencoe, 111. : The Free Press, 1959.
Kett, A. and D. B. Gleicher. "Determinants of Voting Behavior. " Public
Opinion Quarterly
,
14 (Autumn, 1950), 393-412.
Lee, Eugene. "City Elections, a Statistical Profile. " In Municipal Year Book
,
Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1963, 95.
Liebman, Charles. "Functional Differentiation and Political Characteristics
of Suburbs." American Journal of Sociology, LXVI (March, 1961),
485-491.
Lineberry, Robert and Edmund Fowler. "Reformism and Public Policies in
American Cities." American Political Science Review , 61 (Sept. 1967),
706.
Lineberry, Robert. "Public Policies in American Cities. " (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, microfilmed, University of North Carolina, 1966).
174
Lipeet, Seymour, et_al» ’’The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political
Behavior." In Gardner Lendzey, (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology
.
2, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley
,
1954, 1136-41.
Long, Norton. "Political Science and the City." hi Leo Schnore (ed.), Social
Science and the City
. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968.
Martin, Roscoe. "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study." Southwestern
Political and Social Science Quarterly
,
14 (1963), 193-237.
Milbraith, Lester. "Political Participation in the States." In Herbert
Jacobs and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Comparative State Politics
.
Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
Miller, Warren. "The Political Behavior of the Electorate. " American
Government Annual, 1960-1961 . Earl Latham, et al.(eds. ), Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
Morlan, Robert. "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis. " National
Municipal Review, (November, 1949), 485-490.
National Municipal League . "500 Non-Political Elections. " Chicago: Inter-
national City Manager's Association, 1958), 172.
National Municipal Review . "The Story of the Council Manager Plan. "
Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1959.
National Municipal Review. "Forms of Municipal Government. Chicago:
International City Manager's Association, 1958).
Nixon, Charles R. "The Coming Electorate: 1965-1970." Western Political
Quarterly, 13 (1960), 620-635.
O'Rourke, Lawrence. Voting Behavior in the Forty-five Cities of Los Angeles
County. Los Angeles: Bureau of Government Research, University
of California, 1953.
Parenti, Michael. "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification.
"
American Political Science Review , 61 (Sept. 1967), 717.
Patterson, Samuel C. "The Political Cultures of the American States.
"
Journal of Politics, 30 (Feb. 1968), 204-207.
175
Pearson, G. W. "Prediction in A Non-Partisan Election." Public Opinion
Quarterly
, 12 (1948), 112-17.
Pinard, Maurice. "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban
Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums. " American Journal
of Sociology, 68 (March, 1963), 518.
Pomper, Gerald. "Ethnic and Group Voting in Non-Partisan Municipal Elections.
"
Public Opinion Quarterly
, 30 (Spring, 1966), 79.
Price, Don K. "The Promotion of the City Manager Plan. " Public Opinion
Quarterly
, 5 (Winter, 1941), 563-78.
Ranney, Austin. "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study
of Electoral Behavior. " In Ranney (ed. ) Essays in the Behavioral
Study of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962.
Robinson, James A. and William H. Stanley. "Some Correlates of Voting
Behavior: The Case of Indiana. " Journal of Politics
,
22 (February,
1960), 96-111.
Robinson, W. S. "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. "
American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 351-57.
Rosenberg, Morris. "Some Determinants of Voter Apathy. " Public Opinion
Quarterly
,
181 (Winter, 1954-55), 349-66.
Ross, Peter. "Trends in Voting Behavior Research 1933-63." In Edward
Dreyer (ed. ) Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior . Belmont, Calif. :
Wadsworth Publishing Co.
,
1966.
Sait, Edward M. "Machines, Political. " Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , 9
Chicago, 1908, 658.
Salisbury, Robert. "St. Louis Politics: Relationship Among Interest, Parties
and Governmental Structure. " Western Political Quarterly , 13
(June, 1960), 498-507.
Salisbury, Robert and Gordon Black. "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-
Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines. " American Political
Science Review, LVII (Sept., 1963), 584-542.
17G
Sayre, Wallace. "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities." Public
Administration Review
. XIV (Autumn, 1954), 253-58.
Sayre, Wallace and Nelson Polsky. "American Political Science and
Urbanization." In Philip Houser, The Study of Urbanization
. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
Schnore, Leo and Robert R. Alford. "Forms of Government and Socio-
Economic Characteristics of Suburbs." Administrative Science
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-18.
Scott, Thomas. "The Diffusion of Urban Governmental Forms As A Case of
Social Learning. " Journal of Politics
, 30 (November, 1968), 1901-1108.
Sherbenou, Edgar. "Class Participation and the Council-Manager Plan."
Public Administration Review
,
21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135.
Stone, Harold, Don Price and Kathryn H. Stone. "The Theory of Good
Government. " In Edward Banfield’s Urban Government, New York:
MacMillan, 1969, 322.
Templeton, F. "Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research
Findings." Public Opinion Quarterly
,
30 (Summer, 1966), 249.
Titus, Charles. "Voting in California Cities, 1900-1925. " Southwestern
Political and Social Science Quarterly
,
8 (1928), 383-99.
Uyeki, Eugene S. "Patterns of Voting in Metropolitan Areas 1938-1962. "
Urban Affairs Quarterly
,
1 (June, 1966), 65-67.
White, Leonard. "The Role of the City Manager. " In Edward Banfield,
Urban Government, New York: MacMillan Company, 1969, 299.
Williams, Oliver and C. Adrian. "Insulation of Local Politics Under the
Nonpartisan Ballot. " American Political Science Review , 53 (December,
1959, 1052-63.
Wolfinger, Raymond. "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. "
American Political Science Review
,
59 (December, 1965), 896-908.
Wolfinger, Raymond. "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics " In M. Kent
Jennings and Harmon Ziegler (eds.) Electoral Process , Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966.
177
Wolfinger, Raymond and John Osgood Field. "Political Ethos and the Structure
of Government." American Political Science Review
,
LX (June, 1966),
306-26.
Government Publications
U. S. Bureau of the Census. 1960 Census of the United States: Social and
Economic Characteristics of the Population, Part B.
appendix
178
VOTER TURNOUT IN LOCAL ELECTIONS
We are interested in voter turnout for the last two local elections.
(PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTION APPROPRIATE TO YOUR FORM OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
A. IN YOUR (CITY, VILLAGE, TOWN) DIRECTLY ELECTS ITS MAYOR,
record below the total voter turnout in the last two general elections for
mayor.
Year of Election Total Voter Turnout for Office of Mayor
B. IF YOUR CITY ELECTS ONLY COUNCILMEN OR COMMISSIONERS (i.e .
,
DOES NOT DIRECTLY ELECT THE MAYOR)
,
record below the total votes
received in the last two general elections for council or commission and
the number of vacancies filled.
Total Votes Received by All
Council or Commission Number of Vacancies
Year of Election Candidates Filled
-JM8KK
